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The Devil in Recent American Law 
 





Despite its secular aspirations, the American legal system is 
permeated by Christian and other religious ideas. One of the 
religious ideas that frequently appears in recent American law is 
the devil—the unholy antithesis of all that is good in the world.  
Called by many names, such as Satan, Lucifer, or the Antichrist, 
the devil is no stranger to the United States court system. 
The devil arises from the hot depths primarily in five 
contexts: (1) as a source of injury to reputation in defamation 
cases; (2) as a prejudicial invocation made during criminal trials 
to secure conviction, harshen sentences, or discredit witnesses; (3) 
as a symptom of mental illness or delusion severe enough to 
qualify criminal defendants for insanity pleas and incapacitate 
decedents in probate; (4) as a source of religious conflict between 
inmates and their wardens; and, sometimes (5) as a party to 
litigation. 
This Article broadly surveys each of these five contexts, 
exploring how courts have adjudicated recent disputes that 
involve accusations or admissions of Satanism and associated 
rituals. Readers will learn how American courts have dealt with 
religious ideas that many people find distasteful, dangerous, or 
downright abhorrent.  So far, no grand unifying theme or theory 
is evident, so hopefully this survey will be a springboard for 
further, more focused research and argument as to how the 
American legal system should handle disputes that implicate the 
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Introduction 
 
In 1944, the Supreme Court declared that, in the United 
States, “Man’s relation to his God was made no concern of the 
state.”1 The federal Constitution contains no mention of a 
supreme, supernatural being and religious tests are verboten.2  
American law “knows no heresy, and is committed to the support 
of no dogma, the establishment of no sect.”3  However, even in 
this secular legal tradition, Americans’ religious beliefs—
specifically Christian beliefs—are regularly a concern of judges, 
juries, and appellate panels.4 
Consider the devil.  In both the Catholic and Protestant 
Christian traditions, he is the evil and unholy opposite of the 
ultimate and infinitely good God.  He is a failed usurper who 
defied the Holy Father then was banished from Heaven, 
eventually becoming the king of Hell, where the sinful writhe in 
torment for eternity.5  He is known by the names Lucifer and 
Satan, and by the titles the Evil One, Prince of Darkness, “prince 
of this world, the great dragon, the old serpent, the prince of the 
devils, the prince of the power of the air . . . the Antichrist.”6  He 
plays the cosmic role of “the temptor, the accuser, and the 
 
1.  United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944). 
2.  U.S. CONST. art. VI.  The only aspect of religion American courts are 
qualified to assess, at least according to long-standing Supreme Court doctrine, 
is the sincerity of the believer, not the veracity of the belief.  See Nathan S. 
Chapman, Adjudicating Religious Sincerity, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1185, 1187–88 
(2017). 
3.  Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86 (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 728 
(1871)). 
4.  See generally CHRISTOPHER MCCRUDDEN, LITIGATING RELIGIONS: AN 
ESSAY ON HUMAN RIGHTS, COURTS, AND BELIEFS (2015); Stuart Banner, When 
Christianity was Part of the Common Law, 16 L. & HIST. REV. 27 (1998); A.H. 
Wintersteen, Christianity and the Common Law, 3 AM. L. REG. 273 (1890); 
Sanja Zgonjanin, Quoting the Bible: the Use of Religious References in Judicial 
Decision-Making, 9 CUNY L. REV. 31 (2005). 
5.  Isaiah 14:12-15 (King James) (“How art thou fallen from heaven, O 
Lucifer, son of the morning! how art thou cut down to the ground, which didst 
weaken the nations! For thou hast said in thine heart, I will ascend into 
heaven, I will exalt my throne above the stars of God . . . Yet thou shalt be 
brought down to hell, to the sides of the pit.”). 
6.  PAUL CARUS, THE HISTORY OF THE DEVIL AND THE IDEA OF EVIL 166 
(Lands End Press 1969).  This Article will interchangeably refer to him as “the 
devil” or “Satan” for the sake of simplicity. 
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destroyer.”7  He is “the archvillain of world culture.”8 
In the culture of American law, the devil appears often.  His 
dark unholiness arises from the hot depths primarily in five 
contexts: (1) as a source of injury to reputation in defamation 
cases; (2) as a prejudicial invocation made during criminal trials 
to secure conviction, harshen sentences, or discredit witnesses; 
(3) as a symptom of mental illness or delusion severe enough to 
qualify criminal defendants for insanity pleas and incapacitate 
decedents in probate; (4) as a source of religious conflict between 
inmates and their wardens; and, sometimes (5) as a party to 
litigation.  This Article will broadly survey each of these five 
contexts in turn.9 
The Article begins by describing how accusations of devil 
worship can spark claims for slander or libel, and also how 
common law and constitutional principles of religious freedom 
can close the courts to certain religious defamation plaintiffs.  
Part II then explores a similar reputational injury in the context 
 
7.  Wendy Griswold, The Devil’s Techniques: Cultural Legitimation and 
Social Change, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 668, 670 (1983). 
8.  T.J. WRAY & GREGORY MOBLEY, THE BIRTH OF SATAN: TRACING THE 
DEVIL’S BIBLICAL ROOTS xiii (2005). 
9.  This Article will not be an exhaustive survey of every case in which the 
devil is invoked since the founding of America, but will focus instead on key 
historical and contemporary cases that are representative of the above five 
contexts.  Beyond the scope of this article are references to the devil in other 
types of cases, such as in criminal appeals by members of the Chicago-based 
street gang the Satan Disciples.  See, e.g., People v. Roque, 2013 IL App (1st) 
112578-U (2013); People v. Hernandez, 840 N.E. 2d 1254 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).  
Or in intellectual property disputes, between artists (for whom the Devil is the 
subject of their art) and alleged infringers.  See, e.g., Porto v. Guirgis, 659 F. 
Supp. 2d 597 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Michelle Castillo, The Satanic Temple Sues 
Netflix for $150 Million for Using a Statue of a Demon God in ‘The Chilling 
Adventures of Sabrina,’ CNBC.COM (Nov. 9, 2018, 11:35 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/08/the-satanic-temple-sues-netflix-warner-
bros-for-150-million.html.  Or in cases where people religiously object to 
obtaining or disclosing Social Security numbers for fear they will carry the 
“mark of the beast” or be corrupted by the Antichrist.  See, e.g., McKay v. 
Thompson, 226 F.3d 752 (6th Cir. 2000); Callahan v. Woods, 736 F.2d 1269 
(9th Cir. 1984); Stevens v. Berger, 428 F. Supp 896 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).  Or in 
disputes between the government and companies with religious-sounding 
names.  See, e.g., United States v. Devil’s Hole, Inc., 747 F.2d 895 (3d Cir. 
1984).  Or in Establishment Clause challenges to school mascots.  See, e.g., 
Kunselman v. W. Reserve Local Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ., 70 F.3d 931, 933 (6th 
Cir. 1995) (“No reasonable observer would believe that the use of the [Blue] 
devil as a mascot is meant to . . . advocat[e] Satanism . . .”). 
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of prejudicial bias against defendants; that is, accusations of 
devilish doings in criminal trials.  Subsequently, Part III will 
explain how demonic delusions (admitted or otherwise) can 
create questions of competence and capacity for defendants and 
decedents alike.  Part IV probes the mostly one-sided free 
exercise battle between prison officials and incarcerated 
Satanists.  Finally, the discussion ends on a humorous note as 
the devil and his minions become parties to lawsuits of varying 
levels of frivolity. 
The author’s ultimate goal is that this preliminary survey 
will spark additional research into one or more of the above 
contexts.  The devil-related court rulings discussed, infra, raise 
serious questions about church/state separation, religious bias 
by judges and juries, and how American legal institutions 
discriminate among faiths.  This Article does not present any 
grand, unifying theories about how the concept of the devil has 
shaped American law, nor does this Article make any 
prescriptive arguments about how courts should handle 
Luciferian litigation. 
If there is one recurring theme here, however, it is that 
nearly all litigatory invocations of the devil create tangibly 
negative legal outcomes, and not just because one party always 
has to lose.  In American law, accusations (and admissions) of 
Satanic loyalty cause damage to reputations, create civil 
liability, help to convict defendants, harshen sentences, 
constrain religious exercise, and get claims dismissed.  The 
American legal system, ostensibly secular as it is, is not 
insulated from the bad religious baggage that Satan carries. 
 
I.  The Defamatory Devil 
 
An ungodly man diggeth up evil: and in his lips there 
is as a burning fire. A froward man sowethstrife: and a 
whisperer separateth chief friends. 
– Proverbs 16:27-28 
 
Defamation is the devil’s preeminent stalking ground in 
American law.  This is fitting, because the shared root of the 
English words “devil” and “diabolic” is διάβολος, translated from 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/9
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the Greek as diabolos, an adjective that means slanderous.10 
The Bible describes the devil as the father of lying.11  Satan 
exists as a dishonest foil to the absolute honesty of God, and to 
be in league with him is to be a bad, untrustworthy person, an 
“enemy of all righteousness.”12  Thus, accusations of devil 
worship, demonic servitude, or diabolical sympathy can 
seriously injure a person’s reputation in any Christian 
community, or worse, injure the person herself because death is 
one of the Biblical punishments recommended for wizards, 
witches, and other devilish devotees.13 
Defamatory insinuations of Satanic association are well 
documented in historical court records of England and its 
American colonies.  In 1623, Colchester Borough courts in Essex, 
England heard claims arising from “the circulation of libel 
showing the devil taking tobacco with various of the town’s 
clergymen.”14 Thirty-two years later, in the court of Essex 
County, Massachusetts, a man named Job Tyler was compelled 
to publicly post a hand-written apology to his neighbor Thomas 
Chandler for, in addition to making numerous other slanderous 
utterances, “wishing the devil had him.”15 
That same century, rampant accusations of devilish 
dealings tore apart the “little theocracies” of colonial America 
like Plymouth and Salem in Massachusetts.16  Dozens of people, 
mostly women, were convicted and severely punished for 
 
10.  JAMES STRONG, DICTIONARIES OF HEBREW AND GREEK WORDS TAKEN 
FROM STRONG’S EXHAUSTIVE CONCORDANCE 1228 (Christian Classic Reprints 
2009) (1890). 
11.  John 8:44 (King James) (“Ye are of your father the devil, and the lusts 
of your father ye will do. He was a murderer from the beginning, and abode not 
in the truth, because there is no truth in him. When he speaketh a lie, he 
speaketh of his own: for he is a liar, and the father of it.”). 
12.  Acts 13:10 (King James). 
13.  Leviticus 20:27 (“A man also or a woman that hath a familiar spirit, 
or that is a wizard, shall surely be put to death; they shall stone them with 
stones: their blood shall be upon them.”). 
14.  J.A. SHARPE, DEFAMATION AND SEXUAL SLANDER IN EARLY MODERN 
ENGLAND: THE CHURCH COURTS AT YORK 5 (1980). 
15.  JULIET HAINES MOFFORD, “THE DEVIL MADE ME DO IT!” CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT IN EARLY NEW ENGLAND 51 (2012). 
16.  LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, LAW IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY 26 
(Modern Library ed. 2002) (cited for the description of colonial communities as 
“little theocracies”). 
5
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witchcraft.17  Though thirteen women were executed in Salem 
alone, some colonial witchcraft suspects were ultimately cleared 
of wrongdoing.  Acquitted women—or, more often, the husbands 
of acquitted women, outraged by meritless attacks on their 
wives’ godliness—did not shrink into the shadows once the 
criminal proceedings were complete.  At least thirty-eight 
common law slander claims, most seeking public retractions, 
were brought between the mid-1600s to the early-1700s in New 
England by women accused of witchcraft.18  When the accusers 
were unable to prove the devil’s explicit presence in the lives of 
the acquitted witches, they were held liable and forced to 
apologize.19  Meanwhile, in Virginia beginning around 1650, 
“slanders and scandals Cast upon Women under the notion of 
 
17.  Witches, after all, were people who, through various mysterious 
rituals and pacts, had “formally given themselves over to the Devil,” and 
received magical powers in exchange for their devoted service.  JEFFREY 
BURTON RUSSELL, MEPHISTOPHELES: THE DEVIL IN THE MODERN WORLD 28 
(1986).  In his influential book, Wonders of the Invisible World (1693), 
Massachusetts minister Cotton Mather argued that witchcraft actually 
triggers an elaborate legal process in which God grants the snitching Devil a 
license to smite “ungodly people” who “give their Consents in witchcrafts 
diabolically performed”: “The Divel is called in 1 Pet. 5.8 Your Adversary. Tis 
a Law-term; and it notes, An Adversary at Law. The Divel cannot come at us, 
except in some sence according to Law . . . The Divel First Goes up as an 
Accuser against us [and] . . . charges us with manifold sins against the Lord 
our God . . . If our Advocate in the Heavens do not now take off his Libels, the 
Divel then with a Concession of God, Comes down, as a Destroyer upon us. . . . 
But such a Permission from God, for the Divel to Come down, and Break in 
upon mankind, oftentimes must be Accompanyed with a Commission from 
some wretches of mankind it self.”  COTTON MATHER, THE WONDERS OF THE 
INVISIBLE WORLD: OBSERVATIONS AS WELL HISTORICAL AS THEOLOGICAL, UPON 
THE NATURE, THE NUMBER, AND THE OPERATIONS OF THE DEVILS 10–11 (Reiner 
Smolinski, ed. 1998) (1693) (emphasis in original). 
18.  RICHARD GODBEER, THE DEVIL’S DOMINION: MAGIC AND RELIGION IN 
EARLY NEW ENGLAND 15 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1994).  Some of the women 
were repeat plaintiffs, having faced multiple false accusations of witchcraft.  
For example, Jane Walford of Portsmouth, New Hampshire was awarded 
damages for slander in both 1648 and 1669.  CAROL F. KARLSEN, THE DEVIL IN 
THE SHAPE OF A WOMAN, WITCHCRAFT IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 62 (First 
Vintage Books Ed. 1989).  Defamation suits brought by men to vindicate 
women far outnumbered suits brought by women themselves, however, 
perhaps because “an attack on the virtue of a single woman put no husband’s 
reputation at stake,” and husbands had standing to pursue defamation 
remedies under the doctrine of coverture.  Donna J. Spindel, The Law of Words: 
Verbal Abuse in North Carolina to 1730, 39 AM. J. LEGAL. HIST. 1, 33 (1995). 
19.  GODBEER, supra note 19, at 153–54. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/9
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Witches” had created such a glut of defamation cases that local 
courts began levying criminal fines (as steep as a thousand 
pounds) against spreaders of infernal falsehoods.20 
By the early 1780s, the witch trials in England and America 
had petered out.21  The rational influence of the Enlightenment 
had settled upon the Western world, and the Lockean idea of 
separating the spiritual dealings of church from the material 
workings of state was gaining popularity, especially in the 
newly-formed United States.22  James Madison proposed a 
division between state and religious matters in his original draft 
of the First Amendment in 1789 and a variation of it was 
eventually ratified two years later.23  In his popular 1794 book 
The Age of Reason, Thomas Paine ravaged Christianity (and its 
diabology) as a tool of theocratic tyranny that should be rejected 
in favor of secular democracy.24  As president in 1802, Thomas 
Jefferson wrote his famous Letter to the Danbury Baptists, 
describing the dual Religion Clauses as “building a wall of 
separation between Church & State.”25 Meanwhile, back in 
England, “belief in the existence of the Devil had practically 
vanished,” at least among the literate classes, by 1800.26 
 
20.  Richard Beale Davis, The Devil in Virginia in the Seventeenth 
Century, 65 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 133, 143–44 (1957). 
21.  ROBERT W. THURSTON, WITCH, WICCE, MOTHER GOOSE: THE RISE AND 
FALL OF THE WITCH HUNTS IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA 79 (2001).  By 
comparison, King Louis XIV had already decriminalized witchcraft in France 
a century earlier.  JEFFREY BURTON RUSSELL, THE PRINCE OF DARKNESS: 
RADICAL EVIL AND THE POWER OF GOOD IN HISTORY 189 (1988). 
22.  NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD 29 (2005). 
23.  How, exactly, Madison felt about secular government’s relationship 
to religion is still hotly debated, both by scholars and by Supreme Court 
justices.  See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, at 612–16, 622–26 (1992) 
(Souter, J., concurring); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91–103 (1985) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Vincent Phillip Muñoz, James Madison’s Principle 
of Religious Liberty, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 17–19 (2003) (summarizing the 
scholarly and judicial debate). 
24.  Peter A. Schock, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell: Blake’s Myth of 
Satan and its Cultural Matrix, 60 ELH 441, 444–45 (1993). 
25.  Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 709 (2005) (Stevens, J, dissenting).  
Just as the debate about Madison’s views still rages, not all scholars and judges 
agree with the Jeffersonian interpretation of the Religion Clauses.  See id. at 
693–94 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Original meaning” of the Establishment 
Clause prohibits only “actual legal coercion,” and does not require strict 
governmental neutrality of any sort) (internal quotations omitted). 
26.  Schock, supra note 25, at 441. 
7
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Serious belief in the devil’s dark presence in the daily affairs 
of men had dissipated just as the newly-independent America 
was beginning to develop its own civil and criminal legal systems 
independent of England.27  However, conservative Christian 
sects still held sway over most American communities 
throughout the first half of the nineteenth century.  Though 
allegations of fiendish frolic had largely disappeared from 
criminal dockets, they had not vanished as a source of social 
strife and civil litigation.  People still accused each other of being 
in league with the prince of darkness, and those accusations still 
harmed reputations within religious congregations and in wider 
communities. 
Once witchcraft was no longer a crime, it became more 
difficult to recover damages for Satan-related insults, depending 
on how and where they were made.  Speaking false claims of 
criminality triggered the common law cause of action now known 
as slander per se, but false claims of non-criminal deviance were 
not usually actionable.  For example, in Pennsylvania in 1806, 
verbally calling someone “Devil,” or “prince of darkness,” or 
“brazen faced Belzebub,” was not considered slander because 
such language “import[ed] passion, but no crime or discredit” to 
the average citizen.28 
Such infernal name-calling was actionable, however, if it 
threatened the livelihood or professional standing of certain 
special members of the community, however, even if no actual 
crime was alleged.  For example, falsely accusing a clergyman of 
being a “preacher of the devil” was actionable because “these 
words if believed, must deprive him of that respect, veneration, 
and confidence, without which he can expect no hearers as a 
 
27.  RUSSELL, supra note 18, at 77. 
28.  M’Millan v. Birch, 1 Binn. 178, 180 (Pa. 1806) (stating “[i]n order to 
make words actionable, they either must contain an express imputation of 
some crime liable to punishment, some capital offence or other infamous crime 
or misdemeanor, or they must be spoken of one in an office of profit, which may 
probably occasion the loss of his office, or of persons touching their respective 
professions trades and business, and do or may probably tend to their damage” 
(citing Onslow v. Horne, 3 Wils. 177 (1771)).  This is the same standard as what 
is now commonly known as “slander per se.”  See 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel & 
Slander § 357 (2019).  The Pennsylvania Court in 1806 did not acknowledge 
the availability of any alternative slander per quod claim, regardless of 
whether the plaintiff alleged special damages. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/9
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minister of the gospel.”29 
Consistent with the English common law distinction 
between written and spoken defamation, claims in American 
courts for Luciferian libel were easier to prove than those for 
Satanic slander.30  For example, in March 1819, Sherman 
Converse, editor of the New Haven newspaper The Connecticut 
Journal, published an accusation that Connecticut postmaster 
and statesman Joshua Stow had openly promoted devil worship 
while participating in the state’s constitutional convention.31  
Converse wrote in the Journal that Stow had had the audacity 
to suggest “that government had no more right to provide by law 
for the support of the worship of the Supreme Being, than for the 
support of the worship of the devil.”32 According to Converse, 
Stow was not making a rational case for secular democracy; he 
was invoking the dark lord to challenge the authority of God.33 
On appeal, Chief Judge Stephen Hosmer of the Connecticut 
Supreme Court of Errors considered whether Converse’s 
editorial could amount to actionable libel.  The Court found that 
it could, even though Stow was accused of no crime.  Writing any 
false accusation of devil worship was simply beyond the pale: 
 
A sentiment so irreverent towards the 
Creator and Governor of the world, and so 
analogous to the modes of thinking, habitual to 
unbelievers and profligate men, would disgrace 
any person who was not a professed infidel. 
Taking it for granted, as we are bound to do, on 
the falsification of this charge, by the jury, that 
the plaintiff in his tenets is a [C]hristian, the 
 
29.  M’Millan, 1 Binn at 184. 
30.  See Nelson v. Musgrave, 10 Mo. 648, 649 (1847) (explaining the 
traditional difference between libel and slander as both common law torts and 
criminal violations). 
31.  Stow v. Converse, 3 Conn. 325, 326–30 (1820). 
32.  Id. at 329. According to the trial testimony of defense witness Dr. Bela 
Farnham, Stow had made that comment, or something close to it, while 
arguing for a constitutional provision separating church and state, because 
even though “it was the duty of all men to worship the Supreme Being,” the 
“Government had no right to enforce this worship.”  ROGER S. SKINNER, REPORT 
OF THE CASE OF JOSHUA STOW VS. SHERMAN CONVERSE FOR A LIBEL 11 (1822). 
33.  SKINNER, supra note 33, at 11. 
9
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injury accruing to him from the preceding 
imputation must necessarily be great. If believed, 
it can scarcely fail to deprive him of the esteem of 
mankind, exclude him from intercourse with men 
of piety and virtue, and render him odious and 
detestable. The evidence of this need not be 
laboured; it is intuitive; and every man, who has 
a common share of intellect and reputation, 
knows, that a charge against him of this 
description, would awaken all his resentment, 
and deprive him of peace until he had successfully 
repelled it.34 
 
After this appeal and a second trial, Stow eventually 
prevailed against Converse.  However, despite a fairly long road 
to a remedy, Stow actually had it easy compared to others.  
Converse was a newspaperman and his libelous insults had been 
published to the Connecticut public at large.  His false charge of 
Satanism was not confined to any congregation, and thus the 
courts were open to Stow’s claim. 
The same philosophical, political, and constitutional 
progress that had phased out the prosecution of witches and 
similar heretics in American criminal courts raised serious 
hurdles for civil litigants fighting false accusations of demonic 
dealings levied at them in church.  With legal matters of church 
and state now at least theoretically separated, defamation 
claims borne from congregational clashes created problems of 
jurisdiction. 
In the 1871 case of Watson v. Jones, the Supreme Court 
declared that purely ecclesiastical disputes and adjudications 
within churches were totally outside the authority of secular 
state courts.35  In the Court’s view, secular courts could exercise 
 
34.  Stow, 3 Conn. at 342 (emphasis in original). 
35.  80 U.S. 679, 728–29 (1871) (stating “[t]he right to organize voluntary 
religious associations to assist in the expression and dissemination of any 
religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for the decision of controverted 
questions of faith within the association, and for the ecclesiastical government 
of all the individual members, congregations, and officers within the general 
association, is unquestioned. All who unite themselves to such a body do so 
with an implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it. But 
it would be a vain consent and would lead to the total subversion of such 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/9
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no jurisdiction over matters which concerned “theological 
controversy, church discipline . . . or the conformity of members 
of the church to the standard of morals required of them.”36 
Since Watson, this ecclesiastical abstention doctrine has 
“been absorbed into constitutional law as orthodox 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clause doctrine.”37 The now-
incorporated First Amendment mandates the same hands-off 
approach as the old common law doctrine, and thus all internal 
church conflicts must be considered beyond the jurisdiction of 
the secular courts if they involve any semblance of “religious 
doctrine and practice.”38  This rule also applies to defamation 
actions.39 
It may not surprise you that church elders sometimes lob 
accusations of devil worship or possession at parishioners they 
find troublesome (usually for more worldly reasons).40  Because 
 
religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to 
the secular courts and have them reversed”).  In Watson, the Court imposed 
religious limits on state courts without reference to the Free Exercise or 
Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment, which were not incorporated 
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment until 1940 and 1947, 
respectively.  See Everson v. Bd. of Ed., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (establishment); 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free exercise). 
36.  Watson, 80 U.S. at 733. 
37.  Rodney A. Smolla, Words “Which by Their Very Utterance Inflict 
Injury”: The Evolving Treatment of Inherently Dangerous Speech in Free 
Speech Law and Theory, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 317, 329 (2009).  This doctrine is also 
sometimes called the “church autonomy doctrine,” as originally used by 
Douglas Laycock.  See Douglas Laycock, Towards A General Theory of the 
Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church 
Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981). 
38.  Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l 
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969); see also Serbian E. Orthodox 
Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976).  This same 
principle undergirds the so-called “ministerial exception” to Title VII 
discrimination suits, which arose in the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals and 
was eventually affirmed by the Supreme Court.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012). 
39.  Michael A. Helfand, Litigating Religion, 93 B.U. L. REV. 493, 499, 
517–19 (2013); see also 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 117, at 420 (1995). 
(“Defamation actions are precluded by the First Amendment when an 
examination of the truth of the allegedly defamatory statements would require 
an impermissible inquiry into church doctrine and discipline”). 
40.  Congregational conflict can often become so severe that it gains local 
newsworthiness, and thus the risk of defamation increases.  See Mike Stunson, 
‘Notice of Trespass’: Critics Receive ‘Church Discipline’ Over Vote on Pastor 
Staying, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Jan. 26, 2018),  https://www.kentucky.co 
11
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sincere, supernatural devil worship is statistically very rare,41 
the vast majority of accusations are probably false, and thus 
most Satan-smeared church members could bring meritorious 
defamation claims against their congregational accusers.  But 
that does not mean the courts are always willing to hear such 
claims. 
Consider the case of Gregory Howard. Beginning in 1991, 
Howard and other members of the Covenant Apostolic Church 
of Cincinnati, Ohio sought access to the congregation’s books 
during a financial dispute with church officials.42  After the 
elders refused to turn over the records, the dispute devolved into 
litigation.43  Three years later, once that lawsuit had finally been 
resolved, the Church retaliated, dismissing Howard as a 
member.44 
Howard sued the Church again, this time for defamation.  
He alleged that church officials had justified his 
excommunication by concocting fiendish transgressions: “that he 
was in league with Satan, that he had been overtaken by a fall, 
that he was a defiler of the temple and an enemy of the 
Church . . . .”45  The way Howard saw it, these were slanderous 
insults tied to a secular dispute over money that had nothing to 
do with religious doctrine. 
The Ohio Court of Appeals, citing Watson, disagreed.  The 
decision to dismiss Howard as a member, the Court said, was a 
matter of church discipline.46  Even though Howard’s problems 
 
m/news/state/article196901624.html. 
41.  For example, only 1525 people self-identified their religion as 
“Satanism” on the 2001 British Census, a tiny fraction of the total population 
of over 50 million.  More than 37 million people self-identified as Christian.  
Jonathan Petre, Spiritual Britain Worships Over 170 Different Faiths, 
TELEGRAPH (Dec. 13, 2004, 12:01 AM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ukne 
ws/1478870/Spiritual-Britain-worships-over-170-different-faiths.html.  
Considering the predominance of secular or “rationalist” versions of Satanism 
compared to theistic ones, it would probably be misleading to describe most of 
the respondents to the British Census as “sincere devil worshippers.”  ASBJØRN 
DYRENDAL ET AL., THE INVENTION OF SATANISM 3–7 (2016). 
42.  Howard v. Covenant Apostolic Church, Inc., 705 N.E.2d 385, 386 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1997). 
43.  Id. 
44.  Id. 
45.  Id. at 388. 
46.  Id. 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/9
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with the Church were sparked by his criticism of its financial 
dealings, not its religious doctrine,47 the Court concluded that 
the Church’s discourteous statements were “inextricably 
intertwined with ecclesiastical or religious issues over which 
secular courts have no jurisdiction.”48  The lower court’s 
dismissal of Howard’s defamation claim was affirmed, and he 
was left with no legal remedy. 
Contrast Gregory Howard’s case to that of Jane 
Kliebenstein.  Kliebenstein was a member of Shell Rock United 
Methodist Church in tiny Shell Rock, Iowa.49  After receiving 
reports of conflict within the congregation, UMC supervising 
minister Jerrold Swinton visited the Church, where he 
discovered that Ms. Kliebenstein was a source of regular discord.  
Swinton then sent a letter, not only to members of the Church 
but also to nonmembers living in the local community, 
recommending that the congregation should eliminate the 
“spirit of Satan” working “in their midst” by stripping an 
unnamed troublemaker of her church offices, and perhaps 
ending her membership altogether if necessary.50 
Kliebenstein then sued for libel, arguing that she was the 
obvious subject of the phrase “spirit of Satan,” which falsely 
impugned her good moral character and wounded her reputation 
in the tight-knit community beyond the walls of the church.51  
Swinton and other church officials conceded in the lower court 
that Kliebenstein was in fact the subject of the “spirit of Satan” 
reference, but argued that the phrase was a “purely 
ecclesiastical term, deriving its meaning from religious dogma,” 
and was therefore outside the jurisdiction of the state courts.52  
The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment. 
The Supreme Court of Iowa did not agree, however, that this 
was a purely religious matter.  First, the letter had been sent to 
 
47.  See Matthew 22:21 (King James) (“Render therefore unto Caesar the 
things which are Caesar’s; and unto God the things that are God’s”). 
48.  Howard, 705 N.E.2d at 389. 
49.  Kliebenstein v. Iowa Conf. of the United Methodist Church, 663 
N.W.2d 404 (Iowa 2003).  The 2000 U.S. Census listed Shell Rock’s population 
as 1298. 
50.  Id. at 405. 
51.  Id. 
52.  Id. at 406. 
13
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members of the community outside of the congregation.53  
Second, because Swinton’s letter was published partially to a 
non-church audience, the dispositive question became whether 
“spirit of Satan” could have a secular meaning sufficient to hurt 
Kliebenstein’s wider reputation.54  Relying on four dictionary 
definitions, the Court concluded that “spirit of Satan” obviously 
had religious roots, but the phrase also carried “a common, and 
largely unflattering secular meaning” suggesting an impulse or 
tendency toward “innate wickedness.”55  The letter thus created 
sufficient grounds for a defamation claim, and the Iowa Supreme 
Court reversed summary judgment to allow Kliebenstein’s case 
to proceed.56 
Insinuations of infernal collusion do not always implicate 
sensitive questions of church/state separation, however.  Like 
the 1819 case of Converse v. Stow57 discussed previously within 
this Section, modern day devil-based defamation sometimes 
takes place outside of churches altogether, and thus litigation 
may proceed free from the First Amendment.  Take, for example, 
the truly bizarre and protracted battle between two corporate 
behemoths: Procter & Gamble (P&G) and Amway. 
In the early 1980s, rumors began to circulate among the 
public that P&G was in league with Satan.58  While the true 
origins of the rumors are unknown, some Amway distributors 
helped to spread it.59  For several years Amway management 
tried to suppress the rumors against its chief rival, but when the 
 
53.  Id. at 407 (“The fact that Swinton’s communication about Jane was 
published outside the congregation weakens [the] ecclesiastical shield”). 
54.  Id. 
55.  Kliebenstein, 663 N.W.2d at 408. 
56.  See Chad Olsen, In the Twenty-First Century’s Marketplace of Ideas, 
Will Religious Speech Continue to Be Welcome?: Religious Speech as Grounds 
for Defamation, 37 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 497 (2005). 
57.  3 Conn. 325, 326–330 (1820). 
58.  Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 542 (5th Cir. 
2001). 
59.  Id. Amway has not always had a particularly secular internal culture. 
After all, it was co-founded by conservative Christian activist Richard DeVos.  
See Our Story, AMWAY, https://www.amwayglobal.com/out-story/ (last visited 
Apr. 14, 2019); Ally Boghun, The DeVos Family: Promoting Conservative 
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accusations reemerged in 1995, the relationship between the 
companies fully deteriorated. 
In April of that year, Amway distributor, Randy Haugen, 
internally circulated this account of P&G’s supposedly Satanic 
dealings: 
 
. . . [T]he president of Procter & Gamble 
appeared on the Phil Donahue Show on March 1, 
‘95.60 He announced that due to the openness of 
our society, he was coming out of the closet about 
his association with the church of satan. He stated 
that a large portion of the profits from [P & G] 
products go to support his satanic church. When 
asked by Donahue if stating this on television 
would hurt his business, his reply was, “There are 
not enough Christians in the United States to 
make a difference. . .” 
. . . [I]f you are not sure about a product, look 
for the symbol of the ram’s horn that will appear 
on each product beginning in April. The ram’s 
horn will form the 666 which is known as satan’s 
number. I’ll tell you it really makes you count your 
blessings to have available to all of us a business 
that allows us to buy all the products that we want 
from our own shelf and I guess my real question 
is, if people aren’t being loyal to themselves and 
buying from their own business, then whose 
business are they supporting and who are they 




60.  But see David Mikkelson, Procter & Gamble and Satanism Rumor, 
SNOPES (June 21, 2013), https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/trademark-of-the-
devil/ (claiming that other versions of the rumor put the date of his appearance 
on the show one year earlier; however, no P&G executive ever appeared on any 
episode of the Phil Donahue Show). 
61.  Ty Tribble, Randy Haugen, Amway, Quixtar, Proctor & Gamble and 
Satan, MLMBLOG (Mar. 21, 2007), https://mlmblog.net/site/randy_haugen_am/; 
see also Procter & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 222 F.3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir. 2000).  
Haugen’s message specifically listed forty-three P&G products by name which 
would supposedly bear the ram’s horn symbol. 
15
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The rumor then snowballed through the company: 
 
Some Amway distributors printed fliers 
containing the rumor, circulating them to 
consumers, with a message saying, “We offer you 
an alternative.” The fliers also gave contact 
information for Amway distributors. Although 
P&G has received complaints and inquiries about 
this rumor for the last twenty years . . . the 
number of complaints and inquiries increased 
substantially in the states in which the majority 
of Haugen’s distributors live.62 
 
Despite several subsequent retraction attempts by Haugen, 
the rumor continued to spread among Amway’s many clients.  In 
response, P&G filed federal lawsuits in both Utah and Texas 
against Amway, Haugen, and other distributors, alleging that 
the false Satanism rumor had damaged its reputation, 
interfered with its business dealings, and cost it customers.63  
P&G argued in both lawsuits that Amway’s promotion of the 
rumor violated the Lanham Act.64  The Lanham Act, though 
primarily concerned with trademark infringement, also protects 
businesses from misrepresentations by competitors “in 
commerce” regarding the “nature, characteristics, or quality” of 
their “goods, services, or commercial activities.”65  It is 
essentially a statutory ban on corporate defamation.66 
 
62.  Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 543 (5th Cir. 
2001). 
63.  Id. at 544–545. 
64.  See id; see also Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 280 F.3d 519 
(5th Cir. 2002); Haugen, 222 F.3d 1262. 
65.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2018).  Common law remedies for corporate 
defamation and disparagement may also be available to some plaintiffs.  See 
generally Fred T. Magaziner, Corporate Defamation and Product 
Disparagement: Narrowing the Analogy to Personal Defamation, 75 COLUM. L. 
REV. 963, 1008 (1975). 
66.  P&G also made a Utah state common law slander per se claim against 
Amway which was dismissed by the District Court.  The Tenth Circuit 
affirmed.  Citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 573, the appeals Court 
noted that slander per se requires specific harm to a plaintiff’s trade or 
profession, and the devil worship rumor was simply too general in its 
disparagement: “Although offensive to many, an allegation of Devil worship, 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/9
ARTICLE 9_DUNMAN_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/23/2019  6:46 PM 
2019 DEVIL IN RECENT AMERICAN LAW 945 
Amway countered that Haugen had only listed the names of 
P&G products in his internal message and had not 
misrepresented anything about their nature, characteristics, or 
quality.67  The District Court agreed, and dismissed P&G’s 
Lanham Act claims. 
Upon appeal, the Tenth Circuit disagreed: 
 
The subject message linking P & G to 
Beelzebub clearly concerned the “nature, 
characteristics, [or] qualities . . . of . . . [P & G’s] 
commercial activities,” under the plain meaning of 
that phrase. In particular, the subject message 
asserted that “a large portion of the profits from 
[P & G] products go to support [the church of 
Satan].” Given the common association of Satan 
and immorality, a direct affiliation with the 
church of Satan could certainly undermine a 
corporation’s reputation and goodwill by 
suggesting the corporation conducts its 
commercial activities in an unethical or immoral 
manner.68 
 
Amway then argued that Haugen’s message to other 
distributors was not actually “commercial speech,” and thus not 
subject to the Lanham Act, which prohibits misrepresentations 
“in commerce.”69  Relying on Supreme Court precedent defining 
commercial speech under the First Amendment, the Tenth 
Circuit ruled against Amway, concluding that the “theological 
component” of the Satanism rumor was insufficient to strip it of 
its commercial nature.70  The Lanham Act claim was allowed to 
 
like drunkenness . . . does not pertain to a quality that is peculiarly valuable 
in plaintiffs’ professional activities of manufacturing and selling household 
consumer goods.”  Haugen, 222 F.3d at 1277 (citing comments (c) and (e) to the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 573.  It appears the authors of the 
Restatement used the facts and holding of McMillan v. Birch (discussed above) 
to illustrate the Restatement’s slander per se standard). 
67.  Haugen, 222 F.3d at 1270. 
68.  Id. at 1272 (internal citiations omitted). 
69.  Id. at 1273. 
70.  Id. at 1275. 
17
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move forward in Utah.71 
Back in the District Court on remand, litigation of the 
Lanham Act claims dragged on further for several years, until 
2007, when a jury finally awarded $19.25 million to P&G for 
Haguen’s and other distributors’ spread of the rumor.72  The 
distributors appealed the verdict, but ultimately settled with 
P&G in November 2008.73 
While all of this was unfolding out west, Amway filed suit 
in Michigan for tortious interference against P&G and its law 
firm, as well as against a man named Sidney Schwartz.  
Schwartz had posted a copy of P&G’s Texas complaint (along 
with dozens of allegedly defamatory statements) on his web site, 
which he named “Amway: The Untold Story.”74  P&G’s law firm 
had retained Schwartz as a “non-testifying consultant” and 
given him documents from P&G’s ongoing litigation against 
Amway.75  Schwartz quickly settled, but Amway persisted 
against P&G and its counsel.76 Unfortunately for Amway, 
though, the federal District Court in Michigan dismissed the suit 
 
71.  The Fifth Circuit also remanded P&G’s Lanham Act Claim to the 
District Court in Texas that had dismissed it, but on somewhat different 
grounds.  Rather than concluding, as the Tenth Circuit did, that Haugen’s 
message to other distributors was definitely commercial speech, the Fifth 
Circuit remanded for fact-finding on his motivation for sending it.  If his 
motivation was economic, the message would qualify as commercial speech and 
the Lanham Act claim could proceed.  Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 
280 F.3d 519, 567 (5th Cir. 2002). 
72.  Associated Press, Procter & Gamble Awarded $19.25 Million in 
Satanism Lawsuit, FOX NEWS, http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007/03/20/proct 
er-gamble-awarded-125-million-in-satanism-lawsuit.html (last updated Jan. 
13, 2015).  On remand, the Utah District Court had dismissed the Lanham Act 
claims against Amway due a lack of vicarious liability, a ruling the Tenth 
Circuit affirmed.  See generally Procter & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 317 F.3d 1121 
(10th Cir. 2003).  The Fifth Circuit followed the Tenth Circuit’s lead, ruling 
that res judicata precluded identical claims against Amway in Texas once the 
Utah claims had been dismissed.  Amway Corp., 376 F.3d at 496.  The Tenth 
Circuit reversed, however, a second attempt by the Utah District Court to 
dismiss the Lanham Act claims against Haugen and the other distributors.  
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 427 F.3d 727 (10th Cir. 2005).  
73.  Matthew Heller, P&G Satan Rumors Case Settles After Epic Battle, 
ONPOINT NEWS (Dec. 16, 2008), http://www.onpointnews.com/NEWS/pag-
satan-rumors-case-settles-after-epic-battle.html. 
74.  Amway Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 346 F.3d 180, 181–182 (6th 
Cir. 2003). 
75.  Id. at 182. 
76.  Id. at 181. 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/9
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based on the Michigan Fair Reporting Privilege.77 
Affirming that dismissal, the Sixth Circuit colorfully 
prefaced its account of the “long history of corporate warfare” 
between P&G and Amway: 
 
Recitation of the extensive and hate-filled 
history between P&G and Amway would take a 
writing as long as both the Old and New 
Testaments and involve at least one of the Good 
Book’s more prominent players. Although each 
side would likely argue, if given the chance, that 
its opponent was in the garden advising the 
serpent when Eve took her first bite of the apple, 
for our purposes we need only go back to the 1970s 
and Satan’s rumored more recent activity with 
and interest in soap products. For more than 
twenty years, rumors of a relationship between 
Lucifer and the soap manufacturer P & G-some 
spread by Amway’s distributors-have circled the 
globe, dogging P & G like a hound of hell . . .78 
 
After explaining why Amway could not prevail on its claims 
against P&G and its law firm, the Court pleaded with the 
crusading combatants to call off their holy war, hoping that they 
would “consider the impact of their continuing legal battle on the 
scarce resources of the courts.”79 
The battle between the two companies occurred during a 
strange time in America.  Many of the diabolic rumors swirling 
against P&G coincided with a larger phenomenon: the so-called 
“Satanic Panic” of the 1980s and early 1990s.80 
 
77.  Id. at 188. Under Michigan law, “[d]amages shall not be awarded in 
a libel action for the publication or broadcast of a fair and true report of matters 
of public record, a public and official proceeding, or of a governmental notice, 
announcement, written or recorded report or record generally available to the 
public . . . .” Mich. Comp Laws § 600.2911(3) (2018). 
78.  Amway Corp., 346 F.3d at 182. 
79.  Id. at 188. 
80.  “Satanic Panic is a term used to describe a phenomenon which occurs 
with alarming regularity in areas with deeply rooted Christian traditions. 
Various forms of Satanic Panic have been observed since the beginning of time, 
and although the specific details may change with the times, the roots and 
19
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In 1980, Canadian psychiatrist Lawrence Pazder published 
a book called Michelle Remembers.  The book told the story of a 
patient who was ritualistically abused as a child by the “Church 
of Satan” during the mid-1950s.81  These were the first public 
charges of satanic ritual abuse in the United States and the book 
ultimately triggered a wide-scale moral panic that lasted more 
than a decade.82  The surrounding hysteria fueled several high 
profile criminal cases, including the Kern County and McMartin 
Pre-School child abuse trials in California and the West 
Memphis Three murder trials in Arkansas.  Ultimately, some 
defendants were acquitted, and most of those convicted for devil-
related crimes had their convictions reversed as new evidence 
emerged or old witnesses recanted.83  Some of the exonerated 
 
results are the same as they have been throughout history. Satanic Panics 
occur when superstitious people in power choose to explain events that are 
difficult for them to comprehend by blaming demons and witches.”  Dan 
Stidham, Haley Fitzgerald & Jason Baldwin, Satanic Panic and Defending the 
West Memphis Three: How Cultural Differences Can Play a Major Role in 
Criminal Cases, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 1061, 1068 (2012). 
81.  MICHELLE SMITH & LAWRENCE PAZDER, MICHELLE REMEMBERS (1980). 
82.  DEBBIE NATHAN & MICHAEL SNEDEKER, SATAN’S SILENCE: RITUAL 
ABUSE AND THE MAKING OF A MODERN AMERICAN WITCH HUNT 45 (2001); see also 
Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142, 155–57 (2nd Cir. 2010) (summarizing the 
relevant events of “the late-1980’s and early-1990’s, a period in which 
allegations of outrageously bizarre and often ritualistic child abuse spread like 
wildfire across the country . . .”); PHILIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING 
CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD MOLESTER IN MODERN AMERICA 166 (Yale Univ. Press 
2004). 
83.  See Samuel R. Gross, Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 
2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 539–40 n.40 (2005); Clyde Haberman, 
The Trial that Unleashed Hysteria Over Child Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/10/us/the-trial-that-unleashed-
hysteria-over-child-abuse.html (regarding the McMartin and Wee Care 
Nursery School cases); Maggie Jones, Who Was Abused?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. 
(Sept. 19, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/19/magazine/who-was-
abused.html; Campbell Robertson, Deal Frees ‘West Memphis Three’ in 
Arkansas, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/20/us 
/20arkansas.html; 30 Years Later, Key Figures Reflect on McMartin Preschool 
Case, CBS L.A. (Aug. 4, 2014), https://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2014/08/04/30-
years-later-key-figures-reflect-on-mcmartin-child-abuse-case/0.  Not all of 
those convicted have been released, however, including Frank Fuster, 
convicted for ritualistic child abuse in 1984.  Aja Romano, The History of 
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later sued.84 
Ironically, perhaps, Michelle Remembers may have also 
triggered legal action from the unlikeliest of all devil-related 
defamation plaintiffs.  After publication of the book, Anton 
LaVey, a self-styled Satanist and the founder of the real Church 
of Satan, sued, or at least threatened to sue, Pazder for libel.85  
It is not clear whether he actually filed a complaint or not.  
Author Mary de Young claims that Pazder retracted his 
factually impossible allegations about the Church’s abusive 
rituals (which allegedly occurred before the Church ever existed) 
after LaVey merely threatened a lawsuit.86  However, the 
Church of Satan itself claims LaVey did in fact file a complaint 
in 1981, and in an affidavit LaVey disputed Pazder’s claim that 
he was unaware of LaVey’s organization when Michelle 
Remembers was published.87 
Clearly, Satan is no stranger to American tort law.  
Accusations of devil worship can lead to serious social penalties 
for the accused (and thus great liability for the accusers).  The 
dark lord is no stranger to criminal law, either, even though 
witch trials have long been a relic of the past.  It makes sense—
if an allegation of antichrist allegiance can damage a person’s 
social reputation, certainly the same could be used as a 
 
84.  For example, Jeffrey Modahl, convicted for molestation during the 
Kern County panic of 1983, was granted habeas relief in 1999.  He 
subsequently sued the prosecutor and investigating officers in his case for civil 
rights violations, but the Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed the dismissal of his 
claims on immunity grounds.  Modahl v. County of Kern, 61 Fed. Appx. 394 
(9th Cir. 2003).  John Stohl, whose conviction in the Kern County cases was 
overturned, settled a civil rights suit against the county for $5 million.  Kern 
to Pay $5M Settlement to ‘Witch Hunt’ Man, BAKERSFIELDNOW.COM (Sept. 15, 
2009), https://web.archive.org/web/20100807001433/http://www.bakersfieldno 
w.com/news/59395087.html. 
85.  Truth being the ultimate defense to any defamation action, LaVey’s 
self-claimed status as a Satanist would normally have disqualified him as a 
devil-related defamation plaintiff.  But LaVey’s Church of Satan was founded 
in 1966, and thus could not possibly have been the source of ritualistic child 
abuse in the 1950s. 
86.  MARY DE YOUNG, THE DAY CARE RITUAL ABUSE MORAL PANIC 23–24 
(2004). 
87.  Peggy Nadramia, From the Church of Satan Archives, 
http://www.churchofsatan.com/from-the-cos-archives.php (last visited July 2, 
2019).  The author of this Article could not locate any corroborating court 
documents to confirm whether LaVey actually filed suit, and if so, what the 
ultimate outcome may have been. 
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prosecutorial weapon against those accused of crimes.  The next 
Section explores how prosecutors have tried to turn their 
community’s disapproval of the devil into a weapon against 
criminal defendants. 
 
II.  The Prejudicial Devil 
 
Ye are of your father the devil, and the lusts 
of your father ye will do. – John 8:44 
 
Witchcraft may not be a crime in America anymore, but 
devotion to the dark lord can still result in criminal sanction.  
Just as accusations of Satanic collusion can damage a person’s 
public reputation, so too can those accusations harm defendants 
in criminal court.  Despite the general ban on character and 
unfairly prejudicial evidence, criminal courts sometimes allow 
juries to consider a defendant’s devil worship. 
It is a pillar of American criminal law that defendants 
should not be convicted by unfairly prejudicial evidence, such as 
character evidence that the defendant is simply a bad person 
regardless of the specific bad acts for which he is accused.  Long 
before the Federal Rules of Evidence formally codified this 
principle in 1975,88 most courts followed the common law rule 
that “[t]he State may not show defendant’s prior trouble with the 
law, specific criminal acts, or ill name among his neighbors, even 
though such facts might logically be persuasive that he is by 
propensity a probable perpetrator of the crime.”89 “The inquiry 
is not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, 
it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade 
[sic] them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny 
him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge.”90 
Such evidence tends to be unfairly prejudicial because juries 
may convict on an emotional basis, rather than on the weight of 
the factual evidence alone.91 
 
88.  FED. R. EVID. 403, 404. 
89.  Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475 (1948). 
90.  Id. at 475–76. 
91.  FED. R. EVID. 403 (advisory committee’s note to 2017 amendment).  
However, that same evidence is admissible as, among other things, “proof of 
motive.”  FED. R. EVID. 404(b).  For a thorough discussion of how criminal courts 
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Similarly, the Supreme Court has long recognized a First 
Amendment right to “join groups and associate with others 
holding similar beliefs.”92  Evidence of membership in rebellious, 
hateful, or anti-social groups should only be admitted as 
evidence when directly relevant to the crime for which the 
defendant is accused or was convicted.93  Defendants should only 
be convicted for their criminal acts, not for their socially 
distasteful beliefs or associations.  Evidence of constitutionally 
protected beliefs, such as religious beliefs, must be admitted for 
some other purpose than to depict a defendant as “morally 
reprehensible.”94 
As the defamation claims discussed in Part I show, 
American courts assume that most people will automatically 
have a very negative emotional reaction to any alleged Satanist, 
especially one accused of a crime.95  Accusing a defendant or a 
witness of devil worship can be quite discrediting at trial.  
Perhaps this is why prosecutors (and at least one defendant) in 
criminal cases have tried to admit evidence of Satanic 
sympathies against their opponents, though their success in 
doing so has been mixed.96 
Consider the following cases: 
In the early 1980s, Joey Tate was convicted for shoplifting 
in Iowa.97  A fellow customer had reported that he saw Tate come 
out of a dressing room with a bulging vinyl bag.98  When the 
salesman requested to look in the bag, Tate went back to the 
dressing room, dropped two pairs of pants, and then ran out of 
the store.99  He was later arrested.  The bag was entered into 
 
approach the evidentiary distinction between character and motive, see David 
P. Leonard, Character and Motive in Evidence Law, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 439 
(2001). 
92.  Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 163 (1992). 
93.  Id. at 167 (holding that evidence that white defendant was a member 
of the Aryan Brotherhood was irrelevant for sentencing purposes because his 
victim was also white). 
94.  Id. 
95.  See supra pt. I. 
96. See generally George L. Blum, Annotation, Admissibility and 
Prejudicial Effect of Evidence, in Criminal Prosecution, of Defendant’s 
Involvement with Witchcraft, Satanism, or the Like, 18 A.L.R. 5th 804 (1994). 
97.  Iowa v. Tate, 341 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983). 
98.  Id. 
99.  Id. 
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evidence along with a book that Tate had been carrying inside 
titled Satan is Alive and Well on Planet Earth.100 
At trial, the investigating officer testified that he talked to 
Tate about the book, which Tate said he liked and believed to be 
truthful.101  Tate’s attorney did not object to the officer’s 
testimony, but attempted to have Tate testify about the contents 
of the book, which was actually a Christian author’s call to fight 
against Satan’s power over society.102  However, the prosecutor 
objected, arguing that the content of the book was irrelevant, 
and the trial court sustained the objection.103  Tate was not 
allowed to clarify the contents of the book during his testimony. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Iowa reversed Tate’s 
conviction and remanded for a new trial.  When prosecutors 
produce unfavorable evidence, the Court said, defendants must 
be allowed to explain or rebut it (assuming they do not 
successfully object to its admission in the first place).104  This 
was especially true for a book with such an ambiguous and 
potentially prejudicial title: 
 
The title of the book in question, which was 
designed to attract the attention of a bookstore 
browser, does not reveal whether the book 
promotes or opposes satanic worship. Therefore, 
when the police officer testified that defendant 
liked and agreed with the book, the jury may very 
well have concluded that defendant was a Satan 
worshipper. This would obviously be highly 
prejudicial to his case. If the defendant had been 
given the opportunity to offer an explanation, any 
misunderstanding or prejudice could have easily 
been cleared up. The book in question was written 
by a contemporary Christian author. It discusses 
 
100.  Id. 
101.  Id. 
102.  Id. 
103.  Tate, 341 N.W.2d at 64. 
104.  Id. at 65.  The Court did not address whether the book was validly 
admissible in the first place because Tate’s attorney did not raise an objection 
at trial.  However, it is not a stretch to assume the appeals court would have 
also reversed the District Court if it had not sustained such an objection. 
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the author’s beliefs about the evidence of Satan’s 
influence in society and the way in which it can be 
eliminated. While the book is about satanism in 
one sense, it certainly does not promote Satan 
worship.105 
 
The Iowa Court did not explain why a jury would “obviously” 
be prejudiced against Tate if they concluded he was a Satan 
worshipper.  Was Tate’s jury composed entirely of Christians?  
Was he prosecuted in a particularly religious jurisdiction?  That 
is unclear.  The Court just assumed the prejudicial effect was so 
obvious that it scolded the prosecutor: 
 
The prejudice to the defendant should have 
been obvious to the prosecutor in this case. We 
question his decision to use the book at trial for 
any purpose. Assuming, however, that the book 
was relevant to connect the defendant with the 
vinyl bag, its prejudicial effect could have been 
eliminated or at least minimized by a simple 
request for an admonition, agreed to by both sides, 
from the court to the jury that the book did not 
advocate satanic worship but was instead written 
by a noted religious author. Had the prosecutor 
used common sense and discretion in talking 
about the book, additional time, effort, resources 
and expense in this appeal and new trial would 
have been conserved.106 
 
In a somewhat similar case from Illinois, Peter Quiroz, a 
member of the Satan Disciples street gang in Chicago, was on 
trial for murder, robbery, and battery.107  During closing 
arguments, the prosecutor twice referred to him as a “disciple of 
Satan,” rather than as a Satan Disciple.108  On appeal, the 
 
105.  Id. at 64–65. 
106.  Id. at 65.  It is probably fair to assume that the prejudice to the 
defendant was obvious to the prosecutor, and that is precisely why prosecutor 
produced the book and then objected to any effort to clarify its content. 
107.  People v. Quiroz, 628 N.E.2d 542 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). 
108.  Id. at 548. 
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Appellate Court of Illinois held those references to be “clearly 
improper” because “it is obvious that the fact that defendant 
admitted to belonging to the Satan Disciples street gang does 
not lead to the reasonable inference . . . that defendant was ‘a 
disciple of Satan’” and such references were made only to 
inflame religious feeling.109  The Court observed that 
prosecutorial comments “designed to stir religious feeling push 
beyond the bounds of proper courtroom decorum.”110 
Other courts have allowed prejudicial evidence of infernal 
affiliation at the trial stage, however.111  In State v. Bartnick, 
another Iowa criminal case, prosecutors produced a letter 
allegedly signed by Michael Bartnick, on trial for double 
murder.112  In place of Bartnick’s signature, however, appeared 
the handwritten phrase “Satan’s Dog Soldiers” and the number 
“666,” which matched a tattoo on his arm.113  The Court 
acknowledged that the signature portion of the letter was 
prejudicial, but held that its probative value outweighed any 
prejudice because: (1) the letter was essentially a confession to 
the crime, (2) Bartnick denied that he wrote it and thus made 
the signature an issue, and (3) an expert witness testified that it 
 
109.  Id. at 549. 
110.  Id.  Nevertheless, the appellate court held that the prosecutor’s 
remarks did not constitute reversible error in Quiroz’s case because the verdict 
would not have been different without them.  Id.  Contrast this ruling with 
Mitchell v. State, 379 S.E.2d 123 (S.C. 1989) (conviction reversed and 
remanded for new trial upon finding that prosecutor’s introduction of 
defendant’s “devil worship,” without other evidence linking him to the crime, 
improperly placed defendant’s character at issue). 
111.  See State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872, 884–85 (Tenn. 1998) (holding 
questions to witness about defendant’s alleged Satanism was admissible 
because it was relevant to “the defendant’s reputation in the community for 
peacefulness and quietude”); Commonwealth v. Drew, 489 N.E.2d 1233, 1243 
(Mass. 1986) (holding evidence of defendant’s “involvement in Satanism” and 
the victim’s desire to leave defendant’s cult “were inextricably intertwined with 
the description of events on the night of the killing” and thus admissible.); 
Stephan v. State, 422 S.E.2d 25, 26 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (defendant’s affiliation 
with Satanic cult was admissible because it became “relevant and material” to 
motivation for assault of witness who had convinced former cult member to 
leave.); Skinner v. State, 784 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (holding trial 
counsel was not ineffective for not objecting to cross-examination of defendant 
about devil worship, considering defendant repeatedly denied it and no other 
evidence was produced). 
112.  436 N.W.2d 647 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). 
113.  Id. at 648. 
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was in his handwriting.114 
Meanwhile, in Maine, Scott Waterhouse was accused of 
strangling a twelve year-old girl and ritually defiling her 
corpse.115  During his trial, prosecutors produced a tape-recorded 
conversation between police officers and Waterhouse during 
which he described his Satanic practices and beliefs.116  The 
prosecution also produced passages from Anton LaVey’s The 
Satanic Bible, which Waterhouse referenced during his 
interrogation.117  Despite Waterhouse’s argument that such 
evidence was unfairly prejudicial, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Maine ruled that Waterhouse’s references to specific passages 
from The Satanic Bible were probative of motive, identity, and 
intent, because the jury could interpret the passages to be 
consistent with the heinous crime for which he was accused.118 
Then there is the case of Daniel Naylor, convicted of killing 
a young man named Wayne Lange.  Naylor, Lange, and several 
other young men and women had formed a “family” that lived 
together at various locations in the Rochester, Minnesota area 
in the late 1980s.119  Members of this family had become 
interested in both witchcraft and Satanism, and some, including 
both Naylor and Lange, started referring to themselves as 
“warlocks.”120  Then, during a group road trip into the country 
two days before Halloween in 1989, Naylor slashed Lange’s 
throat with a boot knife, killing him.121  When Lange’s body was 
found several hours later, he had suffered what appeared to be 
numerous ritualistic wounds: three slashes across the neck and 
a stab wound to the chest, along with various other cuts and 
 
114.  Id.; see also Skinner, 784 S.W.2d at 873 (holding the admission of a 
letter written by defendant that included allegedly Satanic references 
“Merciful Fate” and “Evil Slayer” was not prejudicial error). 
115.  State v. Waterhouse, 513 A.2d 862, 864 (Me. 1986). 
116.  Id. at 864. 
117.  Id. 
118.  Id. at 864–65.  The admitted passages included, “[d]eath to the 
weakling, wealth to the strong,” “[c]ursed are the feeble, for they shall be 
blotted out,” and “[a]re we not all predatory animals by instinct?”  As discussed 
below in pt. IV, passages from The Satanic Bible have also been cited to deny 
religious free exercise to incarcerated Satanists. 
119.  State v. Naylor, 474 N.W.2d 314, 316 (Minn. 1991). 
120.  Id. 
121.  Id. 
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punctures.122 
At trial, the prosecution produced a variety of evidence of 
Naylor’s involvement in witchcraft and Satanism: testimony 
from co-defendants that Naylor referred to himself as a 
“warlock” and “Satanic high priest,” photographs of books on 
witchcraft and Satanism that Naylor and his co-defendants had 
had access to, and twelve actual books on the same subjects.123  
One of the books, Satanism: Is Your Family Safe?, was an anti-
witchcraft book with a message that “people with long-term 
involvement in witchcraft are necessarily persons with ghastly 
criminal records and that jurors ought to put such people 
away.”124 
On appeal, Naylor argued that admission of this book with 
no limiting instruction to the jury was unfairly prejudicial to 
him.125  The Supreme Court of Minnesota acknowledged that 
admission of the book without limitation was “persuasion by 
illegitimate means,” but concluded that it was harmless error by 
the trial court because “the jury would have decided exactly the 
same way” based on the vast amount of other, admissible 
evidence against Naylor such as the testimony of his co-
defendants and the other books.126  Naylor’s conviction for first-
degree murder was affirmed.127 
Finally, consider the case of Commonwealth v. Costal, 
another example of a court allowing prosecutors to admit 
 
122.  Id. at 317. 
123.  Id. at 318. 
124.  Id. at 319. 
125.  Naylor, 474 N.W.2d at 319 (Naylor argued that the testimony of his 
co-defendants, the photographs of the books, and the eleven other books 
admitted against him were also unfairly prejudicial, but the court rejected 
these arguments). 
126.  Id. at 320 (though not much consolation to Naylor, the court also 
issued a warning: “[W]e caution prosecutors and trial court judges to be 
especially meticulous in their review of books and documentary exhibits . . . 
Prosecutors should avoid putting at risk the fairness of a trial in a serious 
criminal matter by seeking the admission of such marginally relevant, 
cumulative and inflammatory material”). 
127.  See Naylor Denies Killing, Satanic Ties, POST-BULLETIN (May 20, 
1991), https://www.postbulletin.com/naylor-denies-killing-satanic-ties/article_ 
1a6ceb97-7152-5467-9952-6be8e67f53eb.html.  Though he did not testify at 
trial, Naylor gave an interview while in prison in which he denied killing 
Wayne Lange and denied that he was a Satanist: “I was made out to look like 
the Charles Manson of Minnesota,” he said.  Id. 
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prejudicial evidence of Satanic religious beliefs against criminal 
defendants during the guilt phase of a trial.128  Frank Costal was 
convicted of killing a woman and her four year-old daughter in 
their home in July of 1978.129  At trial, prosecutors presented 
evidence that Costal considered himself a “high priest of Satan” 
and had regularly engaged in dark rituals, including the 
murders themselves.130  An expert witness testified that various 
items found in Costal’s home, including “books, posters, plastic 
skulls and bats,” were Satanic paraphernalia.131  The expert also 
“testified to the prominent role of mind control in satanism and 
the practice of causing others to commit crimes and perform 
homosexual acts to further such control.”132 
Costal argued on appeal that the admission of his alleged 
Satanism was contrary to precedent banning the admission of 
religious belief as evidence.133  The Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania had twice before ruled that testimony about 
religion was irrelevant in criminal trials, and inadmissible 
under a 1909 state law categorically banning the use of religious 
belief “for the purpose of affecting [a defendant’s] competency or 
credibility.”134  Nevertheless, the Court in Costal found no error.  
The jury, after all, “was not compelled” to believe the expert 
testimony about Satanism, and could instead choose to believe 
that Costal was merely “play acting” and involved in Satanism 
“as a joke.”135  Prejudicial as the evidence of his religious beliefs 
may have been, it was not unfairly prejudicial, so the Court 
 
128.  Commonwealth v. Costal, 505 A.2d 337 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). 
129.  Id. at 337. 
130.  Id. 
131.  Id. 
132.  Id. (testimony in the trial revealed that Costal had been having a 
gay relationship with his victim’s husband prior to the murders). 
133.  Id. at 202–03. 
134.  Commonwealth v. Greenwood, 413 A.2d 655, 657 (Pa. 1980) 
(questioning defendant’s membership in Universal Life Church was irrelevant 
and contrary to the statute); Commonwealth v. Mimms, 385 A.2d 334, 336 (Pa. 
1978) (questioning  the defendant’s Muslim faith was irrelevant and contrary 
to the statute). 
135.  Costal, 505 A.2d at 338.  On the other hand, the Court also concluded 
that the evidence of Costal’s Satanic beliefs was, “highly probative regarding 
the manner of the slayings,” so it may have been disingenuous of the Court to 
suggest that a jury could easily choose not to believe it.  Id. 
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affirmed his conviction.136 
Though some courts are at least somewhat reluctant to 
entertain diabolical insinuations during the guilt phase of a 
trial, most are quite permissive after a guilty verdict has been 
reached.  During the penalty phase, prosecutors, seeking a 
tougher sentence, generally get far more leeway to admit 
evidence of a convicted defendant’s pro-Satan sentiments. 
In Wisconsin v. Mitchell, the U.S. Supreme Court declared 
that “a defendant’s abstract beliefs, however obnoxious to most 
people, may not be taken into consideration by a sentencing 
judge” without violating the First Amendment.137  However, the 
Court also qualified this strict statement by noting that there is 
no “per se barrier to the admission of evidence concerning one’s 
beliefs or associations” during the sentencing phase as long as 
such evidence is “related to” the crime or “relevant to several 
aggravating factors.”138  Evidence of bad character is considered 
relevant.139  In practice, this qualification has allowed trial 
courts to routinely admit evidence of Satanic belief and 
association at the sentencing stage, and appellate courts 
routinely affirm those admissions. 
In People v. Kipp, the Supreme Court of California rejected 
murder convict Martin Kipp’s argument that admission of a 
letter and his own testimony stating that he harbored Satanic 
sympathies was reversible error.140  His stated beliefs about the 
devil, according to the court, were inconsistent with his 
simultaneous claims of remorse, and therefore fair game: 
 
A favorable view of the biblical figure of Satan 
is generally understood as a symbolic rejection of 
the values of love and compassion, and as 
indicating acceptance of the contrary values of 
 
136.  Id. at 339; see also Commonwealth v. Enders, 595 A.2d 600 (Pa. 
1991) (explaining that physical evidence, such as skulls and occult books, were 
seized from defendants who were convicted of false imprisonment in an alleged 
Satanic ritual which was ruled not unfairly prejudicial). 
137.  508 U.S. 476, 485 (1993). 
138.  Id. at 486. 
139.  Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983). 
140.  See 33 P.3d 450, 474 (Cal. 2001) (noting that the trial court excluded 
evidence of Kipp’s Satanic leanings during the guilt phase, but allowed it 
during the penalty phase). 
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hatred and violence, with a consequent rejection 
of all moral restrictions on crimes such as murder 
and rape. This abhorrent value system is 
inconsistent with defendant’s claimed remorse 
and shame for the murders of his two victims, and 
thus evidence was properly admitted in rebuttal. 
If defendant’s conception of Satan encompassed 
qualities consistent with an attitude of remorse, 
he was free to articulate them.141 
 
Furthermore, the Court said, it was Kipp who had placed 
his own good character at issue during the penalty phase of the 
trial, so there was no error in admitting rebuttal evidence 
showing he had vowed to “his savior, Satan” to commit 
murder.142 
In State v. Jones, the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin affirmed 
a cocaine possession sentence that was based, at least to some 
extent, on the defendant’s past Satanic beliefs and his affiliation 
with a gang called the Sonz of Satan.143  The Defendant argued 
that any consideration of his religious affiliation violated the 
First Amendment.144  The appellate court disagreed, because the 
trial court “did not sentence Jones for his satanic religious 
affiliation; rather, the court found that this affiliation led Jones 
to criminal conduct.”145  There was, according to the court, a 
“reliable nexus” between Jones’ admitted past Satanic beliefs 
and the drug dealing for which he was convicted.146 
In Delaware, Aryan Brotherhood member David Dawson 
was convicted of four counts of first-degree murder and 
 
141.  Id. at 474–75 (supporting its position that Satanism is generally 
understood as an “abhorrent value system” that accepts “hatred and violence” 
or rejects “all moral restrictions on crimes such as murder and rape”) (citing 
McCorkle v. Johnson, 881 F.2d 993, 995–96 (11th Cir. 1989)). 
142.  Id. at 474. 
143.  603 N.W.2d 748 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999). 
144.  Id. 
145.  Id. 
146.  Id.  Perhaps a more reliable (and obvious) nexus could be found 
between Jones’ crimes and his association with the members of the cocaine-
dealing Sonz of Satan.  After all, it was the gang, the Court noted, who actually 
“taught him how to sell drugs.”  Id. 
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sentenced to death.147  During the penalty phase of his trial, the 
Court admitted evidence that Dawson referred to himself as 
“Abaddon,” a name he had tattooed on his stomach, and which 
he told a witness meant “one of Satan’s disciples.”148  Dawson 
argued that the use of the name against him during sentencing 
violated his First Amendment rights.149  The Supreme Court of 
Delaware rejected this argument, however.  “The State did not 
offer that evidence in order to improperly appeal to the jurors’ 
passions and prejudices concerning . . . religion,” the Court 
explained.150 Instead, “[t]he context of the State’s evidence was 
necessary to explain Dawson’s view of himself and how he 
wanted to be viewed by others” and thus was relevant to his 
character, something a jury may consider in a capital case.151 
As these cases illustrate, prosecutors are often allowed to 
admit evidence of devilish doings at the sentencing phase of a 
criminal trial.  However, it is not a total free-for-all; courts are 
sometimes willing to pump the brakes (though it rarely changes 
the ultimate outcome for the defendants). 
Dale Flanagan and Randolph Moore were both convicted in 
1985 for murdering Flanagan’s grandparents in order to collect 
insurance proceeds and an inheritance.152  During the penalty 
phase of their second trial (their prior convictions were reversed 
due to prosecutorial misconduct), the State of Nevada presented 
evidence that the two men were members of a Satanic cult and 
had sworn that “Satan is my God” as part of an initiation 
 
147.  Dawson v. State, 581 A.2d 1078 (Del. 1990). 
148.  Id. at 1085.  According to the Hebrew Bible, Abaddon means 
destruction, and was the name given to “the angel of the bottomless pit” in 
Revelation 9:11 of the King James Version. 
149.  Id. at 1102. 
150.  Id. at 1103. 
151.  Id.  (What is important to a jury when choosing the death penalty is 
an individualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual 
and the “circumstances of the crime”) (citing Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 
879 (1983)).  The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately vacated and remanded 
Dawson, but not because the Delaware court had allowed references to 
“Abaddon.”  Although the Court declared that the admission of constitutionally 
protected beliefs, it must be for some other purpose than to  attack a character.  
The Court limited its discussion to Dawson’s affiliation with the Aryan 
Brotherhood, and did not hold that the admission of his religious beliefs was 
improper.  
152.  Flanagan v. State, 846 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Nev. 1993). 
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ceremony.153  According to the state, “the cult activities were 
relevant to provide the jury with a clearer understanding of the 
[defendants’] characters.”154  The Nevada Supreme Court 
rejected this argument, however, because prosecutors had not 
presented any evidence that the cult actually required or 
engaged in any violent acts, and thus the Defendants’ religious 
practices were “not relevant to help prove any aggravating 
circumstance.”155  In effect, the Court concluded, “the 
prosecution invited the jury to try appellants for heresy.”156  
Flanagan’s and Moore’s death sentences were vacated and their 
cases were remanded for a third penalty hearing.157 
Somewhat similarly, in United States v. Fell, the Second 
Circuit considered whether it was appropriate, during the 
sentencing phase of a capital case, to admit evidence of convicted 
murderer Donald Fell’s “satanic interests,” his “666” tattoo, and 
his wearing of a Slayer t-shirt.158  Prosecutors argued that this 
evidence was relevant to establishing the motive behind the 
multiple killings in the case and to proving the aggravating 
factors necessary to justify a death sentence.159  “According to 
the government,” the court noted, “a Satanist believes he ‘can 
murder rape and rob at will without regard for the moral or legal 
consequences,’” and the proffered evidence established Fell’s 
 
153.  Id. at 1057. 
154.  Id. 
155.  Id. (quoting Dawson, 503 U.S. at 166). 
156.  Id. at 1058–59. 
157.  Id. at 1059.  Unfortunately, for both Flanagan and Moore, their third 
penalty hearing produced the same result as the first two—they were again 
sentenced to death.  The next year, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed their 
convictions and sentences , even though the court concluded that the 
prosecutors had violated Flanagan and Moore’s  First Amendment rights by 
referring to their religious beliefs during closing arguments during the of the 
guilt phase of the second trial.  The Court reasoned that such error during the 
guilt phase was less problematic than at the sentencing phase and, applying 
the harmless error standard, concluded that the remarks had no impact on the 
ultimate outcome of the trial.  See Flanagan v. State, 930 P.2d 691, 693, 700 
(Nev. 1996). 
158.  531 F.3d 197, 227–30 (2d Cir. 2008).  Slayer is a Grammy award-
winning heavy metal band.  See Metal Band Slayer Wins Grammy for Anti-
War Song, REUTERS (Feb. 11, 2007, 6:33 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ 
us-grammys-slayer/metal-band-slayer-wins-grammy-for-anti-war-song-idUS 
N1130509420070212. 
159.  Fell, 531 F.3d at 230. 
33
ARTICLE 9_DUNMAN_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/23/2019  6:46 PM 
962 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 39.2 
identity as a Satanist.160  The evidence was not unfairly 
prejudicial, the Court ruled, not because religious evidence is 
generally acceptable, but because admission of Fell’s beliefs was 
simply not necessary to prove the aggravating factors.161  After 
all, the government had provided other “essentially 
uncontested” evidence of Fell’s murderous brutality.162  
Admitting evidence of Fell’s religious sentiments thus did not 
constitute plain error and his sentence could not be overturned 
on those grounds.163  Unlike Flanagan and Moore, Fell did not 
even win a temporary victory for religious freedom on his 
journey to death row.164 
Finally, we examine one case where a defendant, not a 
prosecutor, tried to use infernal allegations to attack the 
credibility of a hostile witness.  If it is true, as courts have said 
in defamation cases, that allegations of Satanism and devil 
worship carry “a common, and largely unflattering secular 
meaning” suggesting an impulse or tendency toward dishonesty 
and “innate wickedness,”165 then such allegations would no 
doubt be a powerful weapon against witnesses, for whom 
credibility means so much. 
However, the Federal Rules of Evidence put various limits 
on how witness credibility—that is, trustworthiness—can be 
impeached at trial.166  One of those limits, Rule 610, forecloses 
any admission of a witness’s religious beliefs or opinions to 
attack or to bolster credibility.167  If accusations of Satanism and 
 
160.  Id. 
161.  Id. 
162.  Id. 
163.  Id. 
164.  Fell would ultimately plead guilty to four charges in exchange for a 
life sentence.  See Lisa Rathke, Man Pleads Guilty in Vermont Slaying to Avoid 
Death Penalty, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Sept. 28, 2018), 
https://www.pressherald.com/2018/09/28/man-pleads-guilty-in-vermont-
slaying-to-avoid-death-penalty/. 
165.  Kliebenstein v. Iowa Conference of the Methodist Church, 663 
N.W.2d 404, 408 (Iowa 2003). 
166.  FED. R. EVID. 604. 
167.  FED. R. EVID. 610. (“Evidence of a witness’ religious beliefs or 
opinions is not admissible to attack or support the witness’s credibility”).  
Before Rule 604 was enacted in 1975, many states required witnesses to swear 
an oath of religious belief to be considered competent to testify at all, while 
other states permitted non-believers to testify but allowed their credibility to 
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devilish dealings are “inextricably intertwined with 
ecclesiastical or religious issues over which secular courts have 
no jurisdiction,” as the Ohio Court of Appeals declared in 
Howard v. Covenant Apostolic Church,168 then evidentiary rules 
like Rule 610 and the larger principle of fairness upon which 
they are based should exclude such accusations as well.  
However, that has not stopped litigants from at least trying to 
impeach hostile witnesses this way. 
In 1974, the Supreme Court of Nebraska considered the case 
of State v. Zobel.169  Zobel was convicted on a misdemeanor drug 
charge.  The only witness against him at his trial was a 
Nebraska State Patrol officer named Rick Houchin, who testified 
that he had purchased a controlled substance from Zobel, a claim 
which Zobel denied.170  As the only witness for the prosecution, 
Houchin’s credibility was a critical issue in the trial.  To attack 
it, the defense came up with a clever strategy: “establish 
Houchin’s status as a devotee of Satan.”171 
Defense counsel tried to get Houchin to admit to being not 
just a cop, but also a “Priest of Satan” who, as a prerequisite, 
had to “foreswear allegiance to God and Christ and accept evil, 
the embodiment of evil or Satan as omnipotent” and also 
forswear “all that is good and truthful.”172  The defense asked 
Houchin a series of questions, some of which were successfully 
objected to, about whether he had “attempted to interest other 
young people in Satanism and the worship of Satan” and 
whether he had “ever said to any person that [he was] a Priest 
of the Devil.”173  Only two questions along this line were allowed.  
The defense asked whether Houchin had ever “made an oath 
rejecting the power of God and Christ and accepting Satan as 
omnipotent,” and whether he had ever told anyone else that he 
 
be attacked on a religious basis.  See, e.g., Paul W. Kaufman, Disbelieving 
Nonbelievers: Atheism, Competence, and Credibility in the Turn of the Century 
American Courtroom, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 395 (2003). 
168.  705 N.E.2d 385, 386 (1997) (discussed at length in Section I above). 
169.  222 N.W.2d 570 (Neb. 1974). 
170.  Id. at 571. 
171.  Id. at 572. 
172.  Id. 
173.  Id. (objection sustained). 
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had done such a thing.174  Houchin said no to both questions. 
On appeal, Zobel argued that his full line of questioning 
should have been allowed, and that he should have been allowed 
to produce impeaching testimony to prove Houchin’s Satanic 
allegiance.175  The Supreme Court of Nebraska rejected these 
arguments: 
 
Of the questions asked, accepting at face 
value the defendant’s offer of proof indicating that 
Satanism entails the rejection of “all that is good 
and truthful,” it is clear that only the two 
questions which were answered and the one 
immediately following had any direct relevance on 
the point of how the witness’ claimed beliefs 
affected his veracity.176 
 
Zobel’s conviction was affirmed.177 
These cases and others illustrate that the criminal courts, 
despite a general limitation on the admission of religious 
character evidence and the sanctity of constitutionally-protected 
rights such as free exercise and association, sometimes do admit 
evidence of demonic devotion to determine guilt and 
punishment.178  This evidence is assessed for other purposes as 
well; as Part III explains below, courts also entertain allegations 
(and admissions) of devil worship and demonic delusion when 
deciding questions of capacity and competence for both 
defendants and the deceased. 
 
 
174.  Id. 
175.  Zobel, 222 N.W.2d 570. 
176.  Id.  The Court rejected the impeachment argument because the law 
in Nebraska states that “impeachment by specific acts which bear upon the 
character trait of veracity is not permitted” as to “avoid pursuit of collateral 
issues,” and “[t]he witness’ alleged activities in the cult of Satan were clearly 
collateral.”  Id. at 572–73 (citing Boche v. State 122 N.W. 72 (Neb. 1909)). 
177.  Id. at 573. 
178.  Criminal cases are not the only place where this is an issue.  
Nonconforming religious beliefs about Satan and his influence on daily life can 
also be prejudicial in civil cases, such as in divorce hearings.  See, e.g., In re 
Marriage of Knighton, 723 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (reversing custody 
order due to unfair reliance on mother’s fundamentalist Christianity, including 
strong belief in Satan’s power and influence, in award of custody to father). 
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III.  The Incompetent Devil 
 
But I fear, lest by any means, as the serpent beguiled Eve 
through his subtilty, so your minds should be corrupted from 
the simplicity that is in Christ. – 2 Corinthians 11:3 
 
Ever since the case of United States v. Ballard in 1944, the 
Supreme Court has consistently held that the only aspect of 
religious belief American courts are allowed to adjudicate is the 
sincerity of the believer.179  For example, under the First 
Amendment and later statutes such as the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, if you can show sincerity, regardless of whether 
or not your beliefs are accurate, plausible, or literally true, it can 
be possible to avoid military deployment, dodge a fraud charge, 
receive asylum, or escape a neutral obligation to provide health 
insurance to your employees.180  But what happens if your 
religious beliefs (especially beliefs about the devil) are a little too 
sincere? 
In American courts, sincere Satanic beliefs are used to prove 
mental illness, insanity, delusion, or other forms of legally-
relevant incompetence.  For example, a defendant may claim an 
intense or literal belief in Satan to prove that they are 
delusional, thus qualifying them for certain defenses or perhaps 
even disqualifying them from standing trial entirely.181  
 
179.  Nathan S. Chapman, Adjudicating Religious Sincerity, 92 WASH. L. 
REV. 1185, 1187–88 (2017).  While Ballard is the first case to expressly 
articulate that only sincerity, not “verity,” may be adjudicated, the general “no-
orthodoxy principle” of American law (as Chapman calls it) traces its origins to 
the 1871 case of Watson v. Jones, discussed at length in Part I, above.  Id. at 
1197 (citing 80 U.S. 679 (1871)). 
180.  Id. at 1188; see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 
682 (2014). 
181.  American courts define “delusion” in a variety of ways, and do so 
“quite independent of the clinical or pathological views of the medical 
profession.”  J.E. Macy, Annotation, Insane Delusion as Invalidating a Will, 
175 A.L.R. 882 § 3 (1948).  For three representative examples, see In re Kaven’s 
Estate, 272 N.W. 696, 698 (Mich. 1937) (stating “[a] person persistently 
believing supposed facts which have no real existence, against all evidence and 
probability, and conducting himself upon the assumption of their existence, 
was so far as such facts are concerned, under an insane delusion”); Batson v. 
Batson, 117 So. 10, 12 (Ala. 1928) (stating “the belief in a state of supposed 
facts that do not exist, and which no rational person would believe, in the 
absence of evidence, to exist, is an insane delusion”); Wigginton’s Ex’rs v. 
37
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Similarly, in will contests, strong evidence of “hyper-religious” 
delusions can rebut the strong presumption of testamentary 
capacity.182 
We begin with criminal defendants. 
In late October, 1985, Gregory Stevens and his wife left Ohio 
on a road trip to Florida.183  After they crossed the border into 
Georgia on I-75, they ran out of gas.184  At some point over the 
next twenty-four hours, while their car was parked on the side 
of the highway, Stevens beat and strangled his wife to death.185 
At trial, Stevens pleaded the defense of insanity, based 
primarily on a long history of mental illness and delusional 
compulsions, as well as on his behavior immediately following 
the murder.186  When he was apprehended by police in Georgia, 
he told them that “his wife was possessed by Satan, that he had 
beaten Satan out of her, and that she would arise the next day 
at noon, rid of the devil.”187  After Stevens’ arrest, a court-
ordered psychiatric evaluation diagnosed him with manic 
depression, delusional compulsion, and an inability to 
distinguish right from wrong.188  According to a social worker at 
the hospital where he was incarcerated before trial, Stevens was 
“one of the sickest patients the hospital had had in a long 
time.”189 
Nevertheless, at trial, the jury rejected his insanity defense, 
found him “guilty but mentally ill,” and sentenced him to life in 
prison.190 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia 
 
Wigginton, 239 S.W. 455, 459 (Ky. 1922) (stating “[a]n insane delusion . . . is 
the spontaneous production of a diseased mind, leading to a belief in the 
existence of something which either does not exist or does not exist in the 
manner believed”). 
182.  However, as explained below, when it comes to the question of 
mental capacity in will contests, sincere beliefs in devilish influence are 
generally not enough reason for courts to toss aside the last wishes of testators 
because American courts give great deference to the competence of the dead. 
183.  Stevens v. State, 350 S.E.2d 21, 21 (Ga. 1986). 
184.  Id. 
185.  Id. 
186.  Id. at 22. 
187.  Id. at 21. 
188.  Id. at 22. 
189.  Stevens, 350 S.E.2d at 22. 
190.  Id. at 21.  Under Georgia law, a jury has five verdict options any 
time a defendant claims insanity.  They can find the defendant guilty, not 
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acknowledged that “Georgia law presumes the sanity of an 
accused,” but reversed the conviction, holding that Stevens 
deserved a not guilty verdict due to the severity of his 
delusions.191  Under Georgia law, a defendant should be found 
not guilty if the defendant’s criminal act “was connected with [a] 
delusion under which the defendant was laboring” and “the 
delusion was as to a fact which, if true, would have justified the 
act.”192  This was certainly the case for Stevens; the Court held: 
 
The evidence was overwhelming that at the 
time the defendant killed his wife he was 
operating under the delusion that she was 
possessed by satan and that he, the defendant, 
was defending himself against satan’s physical 
attacks and attempts to trap and destroy him, as 
well as putting an end to the evil and destruction 
in the world caused by satan. This evidence 
demanded a finding that the defendant met the 
justification criterion for a defense of delusional 
compulsion.193 
 
In other words, under the reasoning of Georgia law, if 
Stevens’ delusions about Satan’s possession of his wife had been 
true, he would have been justified in trying to beat the devil out 
of her, and thus could not be held guilty of her murder. 
More than twenty years later, a similar case arose in 
Illinois.  In 2005, a Chicago resident named Amir Kando 
attacked and stabbed his neighbor Jason Burley.194  At trial, 
Kando raised an insanity defense, but, like Stevens in Georgia, 
 
guilty, “not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the crime,” “guilty but 
mentally ill at the time of the crime,” or “guilty but with intellectual disability 
at the time of the crime.”  GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(b)(1) (2018). 
191.  Stevens, 350 S.E.2d at 22. 
192.  Id. at 22 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-3 (2018). 
193.  Id. at 22–23.  In opposition to Steven’s insanity defense, Georgia 
prosecutors pointed out that he had, at least arguably, taken steps to cover up 
the crime, suggesting that he was not totally delusional.  Stevens had wiped 
the blood from windows of the car, removed his blood-covered shirt and 
undershirt, and had, at some point, “ask[ed] about the death penalty in 
Georgia.”  Id. at 23. 
194.  People v. Kando, 921 N.E.2d 1166, 1168 (Ill. App. 2009). 
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a trial court found Kando guilty but mentally ill, and sentenced 
him to fifteen years in prison.195 
Kando had had a long history of mental illness and suffered 
from religiously-themed delusions.  In preparation for trial, 
Kando was interviewed by two doctors, both of whom he told the 
same general story: he had been receiving messages from Jesus 
“that he should kill and lock up Satan for 1000 years,” so that 
Satan “would not deceive the nations.”196  According to Kando, 
his mind was constantly consumed by images of the devil and 
his minions.  Kando told one doctor that “I’m seeing Satan.  All 
Satanic people, Satanic workers, they’re all Demons.”197 These 
delusions mostly focused on Kando’s neighbor, Jason Burley.  
Kando told doctors and the police that Burley was in fact Satan, 
because he “smelled like Satan” and “looked like Satan.”198  
When one day Burley allegedly told Kando that “Jesus was 
black,” Kando said he considered this to be a provocation by the 
devil himself and felt compelled by Jesus to attack his 
neighbor.199 
According to Kando’s family, his mental illness regularly 
manifested itself as “hyper-religiosity,” in which he would 
constantly pray, be “very preoccupied with religion and with 
matters of God and Satan,” and experience “auditory and visual 
hallucinations with religious themes.”200  During these “hyper-
religious” episodes, Kando would become combative and 
violent.201  The examining doctors confirmed the family’s claims 
and concluded that Kando suffered from a severe psychosis in 
which he could not tell right from wrong or appreciate the 
criminality of his actions.202  Despite this evidence, the trial 
judge concluded that Kando was capable of appreciating the 
criminality of his actions and thus should be found guilty but 
mentally ill.203 
 
195.  Id. 
196.  Id. at 1170 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
197.  Id. at 1171 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
198.  Id. at 1170 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
199.  Id. at 1174 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
200.  Kando, 921 N.E.2d at 1184. 
201.  Id. 
202.  Id. at 1177–78, 1180. 
203.  Id. at 1188–89 (noting that the trial judge relied heavily on Kando’s 
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On appeal, the Appellate Court of Illinois reversed, holding 
that the trial judge had improperly disregarded the testimony of 
two expert doctors and four lay witnesses that had clearly 
established that Kando was gripped by “hyper-religious 
delusions” at all times relevant to his attack on his neighbor 
Burley:204 
 
[It] is undisputed in this case that the 
incident for which defendant was charged was 
conceived and took place in the grip of a psychotic 
delusion. No one suggested an alternative motive 
for defendant’s attack other than to eliminate 
Satan pursuant to a commandment from God . . . 
other than his delusion, namely that the victim 
was Satan whom he was determined to kill or 
incarcerate for 1,000 years. Accordingly 
defendant’s ability to appreciate the criminality of 
his conduct must be viewed from the perspective 
of this delusion, that whatever he did was to 
implement a divine command to attack the victim 
whom he envisioned as a demon or Satan.205 
 
It is not unreasonable to say that the intense sincerity of 
Kando’s religious beliefs is what spared him from conviction for 
attempted murder (though not from involuntary hospitalization 
under Illinois law, pursuant to the appellate Court’s order of 
remand).206  With his case and the Stevens case in mind, it may 
be fair to ask whether American law carves religious exemptions 
to criminal conviction if the sincerity of religious belief is so 
 
behavior immediately following the attack on his neighbor, including 
statements accusing his victim of being to blame for the attack, an effort to 
hide the weapon, and the removal and hiding of his bloody clothing). 
204.  Id. at 1196–97. 
205.  Id. at 1190–91. 
206.  Kando, 921 N.E.2d at 1202; see also United States v. Aleksov, 910 F. 
Supp. 2d 230, 234, 236 (D.D.C. 2012) (describing that Defendant, who pleaded 
not guilty by reason of insanity to threatening the life of President George W. 
Bush, was denied pretrial release from hospitalization because he only 
complied with his medication requirement to secure release from confinement 
and his “delusional system includes the belief that individuals, particularly 
Satan, can control [his] thoughts and actions,” compelling him to act violently). 
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intense that it becomes delusional.207  However, this raises an 
interesting question beyond the scope of this Article: where is 
the line between normative religious belief and delusional 
“hyper-religiosity,” and how do courts find it, considering the 
general principle that religious tests and veracity assessments 
are forbidden?208 
That question of procedure aside, the nebulous distinction 
between religion and delusion arises in another legal context: 
will contests.  Courts frequently consider evidence that a 
testator so intensely suffered from wild fantasies during their 
life that they lacked the capacity necessary to leave a valid will.  
When these fantasies are religious in nature, the courts must 
decide whether they were intense (or, perhaps, sincere) enough 
to render the deceased incapacitated.  As discussed above, 
similar evidence in criminal cases is thoroughly considered and 
defendants may escape conviction because of it.  In will contests, 
however, probate courts generally ignore or wave aside all but 
the strongest evidence of religious delusion. 
In most American jurisdictions, the testator of a will “is 
presumed to be sane and to have sufficient mental capacity to 
make a valid will.”209 Thus the burden is on a will contestant to 
 
207.  Compare Kando, 921 N.E.2d 1166, and, Stevens v. State, 350 S.E.2d 
21, 21 (Ga. 1986), with State v. Hebert, No. 2010 KA 0305, 2011 WL 2119755, 
at *1 (La. Ct. App. 2011) (convicting Defendant for the murder of her two 
children after she failed to rebut presumption of sanity despite testimony that 
Satan spoke to her and commanded her to kill), and Plough v. State, 725 
S.W.2d 494, 500 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (finding the State successfully rebutted 
the insanity claim because the Defendant’s actions after he shot his brother 
were considered “methodical and calculating,” despite his belief that his 
brother was Satan). 
208.  Remember that the Supreme Court has long held that the First 
Amendment prohibits religious tests and trials, and no one can be compelled 
to “answer . . . for the verity of his religious views.”  United States v. Ballard, 
322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944).  However, is that not what happened in the cases of 
Kando and Stevens?  In order to determine whether the Defendants presented 
sufficient insanity defenses, the Courts in those cases had to assess their 
religious beliefs and determined them to be so detached from reality as to be 
delusional, even though both Defendants sincerely held them.  Was it 
appropriate for the court to assume that Stevens’ wife was not actually 
possessed by Satan?  Did the Court have authority to find Kando’s belief of 
Satan on earth to be delusional?  These were in effect religious tests.  Under 
what principle are such religious tests appropriate in the context of a criminal 
prosecution but not in any other case? 
209.  95 C.J.S. Wills § 20 (2018); see also 79 AM. JUR. 2D Wills § 90 (2019); 
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prove that the testator lacked capacity, otherwise the courts will 
not invalidate a will.  Most courts have a “strong preference to 
find a testator competent,”210 and in some states, such as 
Kentucky, the presumption of capacity is so strong that it “can 
only be rebutted by the strongest showing of incapacity.”211 
To show incapacity, will contestants sometimes argue that 
testators suffered from delusions, including hyper-religious 
beliefs in witches, demons, and the devil.  Probate courts view 
this as a questionable strategy, however, because such beliefs 
have long been part of mainstream Christianity, the 
predominant religious tradition in the United States, and 
mainstream beliefs tend not to be viewed as evidence of insanity 
or delusion.212  Accordingly, the general rule in most states since 
the 1800s is that a will cannot be invalidated for lack of capacity 
simply because a testator “was generally disturbed with a 
strange belief in witches, devils, and evil spirits,” even if the 
belief was literal.213  Only if someone becomes truly obsessed 
with such ideas can a case of incapacity perhaps be made out. 
A brief illustration of this rule can be found in Addington v. 
Wilson, an Indiana will contest from 1854.214  The testator, 
Francis Stephen, was “an ordinarily prudent, judicious 
businessman” and “an average farmer” who quite sincerely 
 
28 THOMAS PHILLIP BOGGESS V, CAUSES OF ACTION SECOND SERIES 99 § 32 
(2005). 
210.  BOGGESS, supra note 209, at § 10. 
211.  Bye v. Mattingly, 975 S.W.2d 451, 455 (Ky. 1998). 
212.  J.E. Macy, Annotation, Insane Delusions as Invalidating a Will, 175 
A.L.R. 882 § 30 (1948) (“A mere belief in witchcraft cannot be taken as, in itself, 
an insane delusion. . . . Absolute acceptance of the Bible as the Word of God 
was deemed to require the belief . . .”); see also Scott v. Scott, 72 N.E. 708, 710 
(Ill. 1904) (“An insane delusion is a belief in something impossible in the nature 
of things,” not something that “a great majority of civilized human beings 
believe” such as “the existence of a life beyond the grave”). Contrast the 
deference given to religious belief in the context of will contests with the 
interpretation of religious beliefs as delusional in criminal prosecutions, like 
in the cases of Kando and Stevens, discussed above.  Batson v. Batson, 117 So. 
at 12–13. 
213.  Kelly v. Miller, 39 Miss. 17, 58 (1860) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (citing Lee v. Lee, 15 S.C. L. 183, 4 McCord 183 (1827); McMasters v. 
Blair, 29 Pa. 298 (1857)); see also Henderson v. Jackson, 111 N.W. 821, 823 
(Iowa 1907) (“Nor is it sufficient to show that the testator’s imagination was 
generally controlled by his belief in witches, devils, and evil spirits which 
tormented him”). 
214.  See generally 5 Ind. 153 (Ind. 1854). 
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believed that his late wife and surviving daughters were sinister 
witches who “practised [sic] their infernal arts upon him.”215  
Unsurprisingly, he left his daughters nothing upon his death.  
The Court held that Stephen’s peculiar beliefs were no reason to 
invalidate his stingy will.  After all: 
 
There might be cases where a belief in 
witchcraft, as well as millerism, or the doctrine of 
predestination, if permitted too constantly to 
occupy the mind, might have the effect to obscure 
its perceptions, destroy its balance in regard to the 
ordinary transactions of life, make the believer, in 
short, a monomaniac. But the evidence was not 
such in this case as to make it clear that the jury 
should have so returned their verdict.216 
 
Thus, it is not a particular belief in witches or other 
manifestations of devilish influence that can indicate incapacity, 
unless the testator is obsessively fixated on such things to the 
detriment of his or her other concerns.217  Under this generous 
rule, courts rarely invalidate wills for eccentric religious beliefs. 
There is, however, the case of “Crazy George” Caldwell of 
Texas.  The facts are complicated, but the short of it is this: 
before he died, Caldwell left 160 acres of property in Anderson 
County to three of his children, who then granted the property 
to Gulf Oil and an investor.218  Two other children of Caldwell 
contested the grant of property, arguing that Caldwell lacked 
the capacity to execute a valid deed.  Gulf Oil, in defense of the 
 
215.  Id. at 154. 
216.  Id. at 154. 
217.  See O’Dell v. Goff, 112 N.W. 736, 738 (Mich. 1907) (If someone thinks 
“so continually and persistently upon [a] subject . . . as to become a 
monomaniac, incapable of reasoning,” then “a will made in consequence of such 
monomania is void for lack of testamentary capacity”); Wait v. Westfall, 68 
N.E. 271, 276 (Ind. 1903) (stating “when associated with uncontradicted 
proof . . . that the acts of the testator in the conduct of his business affairs, and 
in his social and domestic relations, were uniformly intelligent, rational and 
reasonable, proof of strange and unreasonable beliefs, and of wild and absurd 
stories, standing alone, cannot be termed evidence of a want of testamentary 
capacity”). 
218.  Gulf Oil Corp. v. Walker, 288 S.W.2d 173, 174 (Tex. Ct. App. 1956). 
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deed, produced a favorable will purported to be Caldwell’s, which 
the deed challengers contested on the same grounds.219 
At trial, the challengers of the deed and the will presented 
extensive evidence that their late father, who was locally known 
as “Crazy George,” suffered from insane delusions that 
manifested as bizarre religious ideas.  For example: 
 
[H]e was unable to talk sense about cattle, 
usually getting off the subject and beginning to 
talk about the devil. He sometimes would create a 
disturbance in his house and explain it by saying 
he was having a fight with the devil. He believed 
he died and had physically gone to both heaven 
and hell, and while in these places he had talked 
with the devil, imps, demons and angels; that 
while in hell he had seen the devil making candy 
out of plow points; that hell was black and heaven 
was a pretty place; that while in hell he had heard 
the devil playing a tune on a fiddle and that he 
could sing this tune . . . that while in hell he had 
seen the devil sawing up people with a circular 
saw and throwing them into a lake of fire; he had 
seen the devil’s horse, which was so big it had one 
foot in St. Louis and the other in California. 
George usually refused to cross any bridge and 
sometimes gave the reason that there were devils 
under them; he believed God was unable to kill 
him for twenty years. George beat on stumps, 
believing they were the devil’s home and that he 
must drive the devil out by beating on them. He 
shooed back demons away from fences when he 
crossed them . . . .  He believed he could converse 
with the Lord, the devil and the saints; that he 
could foretell the future.220 
 
Based on this evidence and other testimony showing 
Caldwell’s strained mental condition, the trial jury decided that 
 
219.  Id. 
220.  Id. at 179–80. 
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Caldwell lacked capacity.  On appeal, the Texas Court of Civil 
Appeals affirmed, not simply because Caldwell had bizarre 
beliefs sufficient to be considered delusional, but because he 
suffered “from an unsound mind generally” which made him 
“incapable of knowing and understanding the effects of his act 
in making a will.”221  Acknowledging the permissive rule that no 
delusion short of monomania could prove incapacity, the 
appellate court held that the jury still had plenty of evidence to 
support its verdict in favor of the challengers.222 
So far, we have examined several aspects of American law 
where Satanism carries a seriously negative connotation.  
Accusations of devil worship can damage reputations and 
impose liability, secure convictions, enhance sentences, and 
rebut presumptions of competence.  In Section IV, however, we 
will consider how admissions of Satanism lead to negative 
outcomes in a very specific legal venue: the prison.  Satanism’s 
bad reputation gives wardens and prison officials an excuse to 
restrict inmates’ religious exercise, and the courts nearly always 
allow it. 
 
IV.  The Incarcerated Devil 
 
Wherein in time past ye walked according to the course 
of this world, according to the prince of the power of the 
air, the spirit that now worketh in the children of 
disobedience. – Ephesians 2:2 
 
For avowed Satanists in prison, two competing forces 
collide.  On one side, their constitutional right to the free 
exercise of religion.  On the other, Satanism’s bad reputation as 
a religion of dishonesty, violence, and evil.  This bad reputation 
has force because prison officials routinely use it to justify 
restrictions on Satanic inmates’ otherwise benign religious 
practices, such as the acquisition and possession of holy books, 




221.  Id. at 180–81. 
222.  Id. 
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Under the First Amendment, prison officials need a 
legitimate penal interest to interfere with a prisoner’s right to 
free exercise of religion.223  Under the Religious Land Use and 
Incarcerated Persons Act (RLUIPA), prison officials may not 
place a substantial burden on prisoners’ sincere religious 
exercise without a narrow policy supported by a compelling 
governmental interest.224  Order and safety, according to the 
Supreme Court, qualify as both legitimate penal interests under 
the First Amendment and as compelling government interests 
under the RLUIPA.225  So, a prison official who can reasonably 
articulate a sufficient interest in order and safety can curtail a 
prisoner’s religious practice, and prison officials generally get 
the benefit of the doubt.226 
This doctrine creates a hurdle for incarcerated Satanists for 
two reasons.  First, “Satanism” has a very bad reputation as a 
religion of evil and disorder.  As discussed earlier in Part I, 
mainstream Christian belief holds that to worship the devil is to 
be an evil person, a perpetrator of dishonesty, a potentially 
violent danger to others.227  Negative assumptions like this 
predate the Colonial era witch trials and have been reaffirmed 
 
223.  See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987); Turner v. 
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972).  
“Interference” in most cases means the denial of a religious accommodation to 
a prison rule or policy. 
224.  42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (2018). 
225.  Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722 (2005) (RLUIPA); Turner, 
482 U.S. at 90  (First Amendment). 
226.  In First Amendment claims, the Supreme Court will not “substitute 
[its] judgment on difficult and sensitive matters of institutional administration 
for the determinations of those charged with the formidable task of running a 
prison.” O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 353 (internal quotations omitted).  In RLUIPA 
claims, “courts should not blind themselves to the fact that the analysis is 
conducted in the prison setting.”  Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 866 (2015).  
Nevertheless, even giving prison officials significant deference, the Court has 
periodically ruled in favor of prisoners with minority religious practices.  Id. at 
859  (RLUIPA claim; Muslims); Cutter, 544 U.S. 709 (RLUIPA claim; 
Asatruans, Wiccans, Church of Jesus Christ Christians, and Satanists); Cruz, 
405 U.S. 319 (First Amendment claim; Buddhists). 
227.  This is, for what it is worth, not an accurate description of 
predominant Satanist belief.  According to Patrick Elkins, “Satanism is a 
benign religion” and “does not teach hatred.”  “Satanists obey the law.”  Patrick 
K.A. Elkins, The Devil You Know!: Should Prisoners Have the Right to Practice 
Satanism?, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 613, 642–44 (2004). 
47
ARTICLE 9_DUNMAN_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/23/2019  6:46 PM 
976 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 39.2 
in American pop culture as recently as the 1990s.228  Prison 
officials embracing these stereotypes have refused to 
accommodate the practice of Satanism among inmates.  Second, 
many inmates who profess to be Satanists are not very 
sympathetic plaintiffs, often admitting to antisocial beliefs that 
bolster the negative stereotypes of their religion.  
Unsurprisingly, courts have mostly ruled against them.229 
One unsympathetic prisoner was Charles McCorkle, an 
Alabama inmate who sued prison officials when he was denied 
access to two Satanic books and a medallion.230  The prison 
defended itself first by denying that Satanism is a religion at all, 
second by denying that McCorkle was a sincere believer even if 
Satanism is a religion, and third by claiming that his practice of 
Satanism posed a security threat to the prison.231  Why?  
Because, as the prison put it, Satanism “teaches hatred for one’s 
fellow man and disrespect for laws and legal order, and 
encourages the practice of violent acts such as flesh-eating and 
bloodletting.”232 
In affirming the dismissal of his suit, the Eleventh Circuit, 
per curiam, dodged the first two questions and turned instead to 
the prison’s security concerns, which the Court believed were 
justified based on McCorkle’s own testimony about his Satanic 
beliefs.  According to him, many of the rituals he sought to study 
 
228.  See related discussion in Section I.  Sparked by a series of 
sensational (and false) claims of ritualistic murder and cannibalism performed 
by teenagers and adults, and bolstered by uncritical media reports, fears of 
“Satanic Ritual Abuse” gripped the United States in the early 1990s.  “At the 
height of the scare, people were arrested, charged, and found guilty on what 
hindsight reveals, and contemporary critical thinking revealed, as the flimsiest 
of evidence.”  DYRENDAL ET AL., supra note 42, at 106–07. 
229.  See, e.g.,  Miskam v. McAllister, Civil No. 2:08–02229 JMS, 2011 WL 
1549339, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2011) (holding the prohibition of the comic 
book “Satan’s Sodomy Baby” was not a violation of prisoner’s First Amendment 
rights); Burton v. Frank, No. 03-C-0374-C, 2004 WL 1176171, at *1 (W.D. Wis. 
May 20, 2004) (holding that prison ban of The Satanic Bible by Anton LaVey 
was not a violation of inmate’s First Amendment rights). 
230.  McCorkle v. Johnson, 881 F.2d 993, 994 (11th Cir. 1989).  According 
to the court, the books were The Satanic Bible and The Satanic Book of Rituals.  
The second book was likely misidentified, though.  The actual title is The 
Satanic Rituals.  Both books were written by Anton LaVey, the founder of the 
Church of Satan. 
231.  Id. 
232.  Id. at 996. 
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in the book The Satanic Book of Rituals involved the sacrifice of 
Christians, “[w]rist-slashing, blood-drinking, and the 
consumption of human flesh—usually fingers.”233  Also, 
according to McCorkle, the candles used in such rituals had to 
be “made from the fat of unbaptized infants.”234  Bolstering his 
claims, a fellow inmate testified that he had, on several 
occasions, seen McCorkle performing blood-drawing and paper-
burning rituals on the prison grounds.235 
If this was not scary enough, the Court then turned to the 
contents of The Satanic Bible, “which,” the Court noted, 
McCorkle “claim[ed] to wholeheartedly believe.”236  The Court 
relied on testimony by the prison warden, “proclaimed (but 
unnamed) Satanists,” and its own “independent review of the 
book” to conclude that the book’s teachings “present a significant 
threat to security and order within the prison.”237  The warden 
testified that persons following the teachings of the book “would 
murder, rape or rob at will without regard for the moral or legal 
consequences.”238  Further, the Court paraphrased a portion of 
the book as stating “that right and wrong have been inverted too 
long,” and as challenging readers “to rebel against the laws of 
man and God” and seek revenge against their enemies.239 
The Court was convinced: 
 
Clearly, practices such as those described 
above, and the beliefs that encourage them, 
cannot be tolerated in a prison environment since 
they pose security threats and are directly 
contrary to the goals of the institution. Allowing 
the plaintiff access to the requested books and 
medallion would only encourage such behavior.240 
 
233.  Id. at 995.  The actual book, The Satanic Rituals, contains no such 
rituals, and there is no indication in the court’s opinion that any other party 
reviewed the contents of the book to confirm McCorkle’s account. 
234.  Id. 
235.  Id. 
236.  McCorkle, 881 F.2d at 995. 
237.  Id. 
238.  Id.  
239.  Id. at 995–96.  This is not quite a call to “murder, rape or rob at will,” 
but is perhaps suggestive of such behavior when paraphrased this way. 
240.  Id. at 996. 
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If it was any consolation to McCorkle, though, the Court also 
recognized that he had been able to clandestinely practice his 
own particular form of Satanism without the books and 
medallion and thus the prison’s restrictions had not “foreclosed 
all avenues of his worship of Satan.”241  The prison’s restrictions 
were therefore considered reasonable partially because 
“alternative means of exercising the asserted right remain[ed] 
open.”242 
Seven years later, in 1995, another federal court would 
consider the penological implications of The Satanic Bible.  This 
time, a copy of it was denied to Ohio state prison inmate Robert 
Carpenter.243  Like McCorkle, Carpenter claimed a violation of 
his First Amendment right to free exercise, but unlike McCorkle, 
Carpenter also alleged a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment 
right to equal protection.244  According to Carpenter, the prison 
unfairly discriminated against him and other Satanists by 
allowing inmates to possess copies of the Christian Holy Bible 
and the Muslim Koran, but not allowing inmates to possess The 
Satanic Bible.245 
In their motion for summary judgment, prison officials 
countered Carpenter’s claim with roughly the same defenses 
used against McCorkle’s: Satanism is not a “religion,” but even 
if it is, Carpenter’s ability to practice it had not been burdened, 
and regardless of his beliefs, the prison system had “legitimate 
penological reasons both for distinguishing between Satanism 
and other religions and for barring The Satanic Bible from 
Ohio’s prisons.”246 
The District Court first considered whether Satanism 
qualified as a “religion” for First Amendment purposes.247  To 
 
241.  Id. 
242.  Id. 
243.  Carpenter v. Wilkinson, 946 F. Supp. 522, 523 (N.D. Ohio 1996). 
244.  Id. 
245.  Id. 
246.  Id. at 524. 
247.  Id. at 526–27.  The District Court considered “three ‘useful indicia’ 
for determining the existence of a religion”: first, the address of “fundamental 
and ultimate questions having to do with deep and imponderable matters”; 
second, a comprehensive belief system, rather than “isolated teaching”; and 
finally “certain formal and external signs,” including “formal services,” a 
clergy, and “structure and organization.” Id. (quoting Africa v. Pennsylvania, 
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decide this question, the court relied on The Satanic Bible itself, 
citing several passages which showed that Satanism “addresses 
fundamental questions” (albeit “in an unconventional manner”), 
has dogmas (“sort of”), refers to itself as a “religion,” celebrates 
holidays, and has complex rituals (none of which involve violent 
behavior as suggested by the court in McCorkle).248  Considering 
all of this, the Court concluded that “Satanism appears to have 
at least some of the indicia of a religion,” but it ultimately did 
not matter because the Court was willing to “presume for the 
sake of this motion only that Satanism is a religion the practice 
of which is protected by the First Amendment.”249 
With that inquiry out of the way, the Court then proceeded 
to the real question in the case: was the prison justified in its 
prohibition of The Satanic Bible?250  Initially, the prison system’s 
Publication Screening Committee had recommended that the 
book be allowed, but the director of the system overruled them 
on the basis that the book—specifically its references to human 
sacrifice—was “inflammatory” and thus in violation of prison 
policy against religious practices that “threaten institutional 
security.”251 
The District Court agreed: 
 
The Court ordinarily must defer to the 
institution’s decisions regarding the 
appropriateness of policies and practices. Here, no 
deference is necessary because the Court is in 
complete agreement that large portions of The 
Satanic Bible have great potential for fomenting 
trouble of all kinds in a prison setting, leading to 
difficulty in maintaining security and order and in 
delivering rehabilitative services in the prisons. 
 
662 F.2d 1025, 1032 (3d Cir. 1981)). 
248.  Id. at 527–28. 
249.  Carpenter, 946 F. Supp. at 528  (emphasis in the original).  It is 
unclear from the opinion why the Court conducted such a thorough analysis of 
The Satanic Bible at all if it was just going to presume Satanism was a religion 
anyway. 
250.  Id. at 530 (stating “[t]his case is about a very narrow issue: whether 
there are legitimate penological reasons for prohibiting plaintiff from 
possessing The Satanic Bible”). 
251.  Id. at 529. 
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In addition, much of the publication advocates 
preying on the weak in any way possible for one’s 
own gratification—clearly an extremely 
dangerous “teaching” in any setting, but 
especially in a prison where the weak have fewer 
avoidance strategies at their disposal.252 
 
The Court then provided “a few examples of isolated 
quotations” to illustrate its point, including passages that 
encourage the hatred and smashing of enemies, “eye for eye, 
tooth for tooth” retribution upon adversaries, indulgence in sin, 
indulgence in “natural desires,” human sacrifice, ritual sexual 
gratification, and “intense, calculated hatred and disdain.”253  In 
the Court’s view, this content clearly justified the prison’s 
prohibition of the book, and Carpenter’s First Amendment free 
exercise rights had not been substantially burdened by the ban. 
The District Court also dispatched Carpenter’s Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection claim on similar grounds; because 
The Satanic Bible posed a unique danger of institutional 
disruption and violence, the prison was justified in singling it 
out for prohibition while allowing other holy books like the 
Bible.254 
The Satanic Bible is banned in the prison systems of many 
states, and, almost unanimously, courts have rejected 
challenges under both the First Amendment and the RLUIPA.  
In addition to the rulings in McCorkle (Alabama) and Carpenter 
 
252.  Id. 
253.  Id. 
254.  Id. at 531.  One wonders why both the prison and the court 
considered The Satanic Bible, based on the quoted passages, to pose a 
penological threat sufficient to justify it being singled out from other religious 
texts such as the Holy Bible, which, for example, contains its own fair share of 
violence, references to sacrifice and cannibalism, prescriptions for revenge and 
retribution, and descriptions of antisocial behavior.  See generally JEROME F. 
D. CREACH, VIOLENCE IN SCRIPTURE: INTERPRETATION: RESOURCES FOR THE USE 
OF SCRIPTURE IN THE CHURCH (2013).  As just one example out of a great many, 
consider Deuteronomy 25:11-12, describing what should be done to a woman 
who comes to the aid of her husband in a fight: “When men strive together one 
with another, and the wife of the one draweth near for to deliver her husband 
out of the hand of him that smiteth him, and putteth forth her hand, and taketh 
him by the secrets: Then thou shalt cut off her hand, thine eye shall not pity 
her.”  Deuteronomy 25:11-12 (King James). 
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(Ohio), federal courts have upheld bans of the book in Arizona, 
Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Oregon, and Wisconsin.255  
However, not all inmates of infernal inclination have lost in 
court.  The most notable win by a Satanic prisoner is that of 
Robert Howard, who in 1994 was incarcerated at the Federal 
Correctional Institute at Englewood in Littleton, Colorado.256 
Howard, unlike McCorkle and Carpenter, did not request 
any particular religious items to keep for himself.  Instead, he 
requested “time, space, and implements” necessary to perform 
three specific hour-long Satanic rituals, roughly one per 
 
255.  See, e.g., Goninan v. Holmes, No. 6:12–cv–01555–PK, 2014 WL 
6966990, at *1 (D. Or. Dec. 4, 2014); Ruley v. Stovall, Civil Action No. 10–CV–
142–KKC, 2012 WL 1038665, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 27, 2012) (holding that even 
though confiscation of the book created a “substantial burden,” no violation of 
RLUIPA); Johnson v. Williams, No. 3:07–cv–1659–HZ, 2011 WL 6778711, at 
*1 (D. Or. Dec. 22, 2011) (“It goes without saying that the book . . . could 
negatively impact prison staff and other inmates.”); Hendrickson v. Caruso, 
No. 1:07-cv-304, 2008 WL 623788, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 4, 2008) (adopting 
verbatim Carpenter’s negative position on the book); Winford v. Frank, No. 06-
C-1000, 2008 WL 359728, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 8, 2008) (It was “undisputed” 
that The Satanic Bible is “designed and used to cause harm to other people.”); 
Burton v. Frank, No. 03-C-0374-C, 2004 WL 1176171, at *1 (W.D. Wis. May 
20, 2004) (Ban of book and other items justified even though inmate had “no 
other means of practicing Satanism.”); Doty v. Lewis, 995 F.Supp 1081 (D. 
Arizona 1998) (holding that the book, “in the hands of Plaintiff presented a 
serious threat to the safety and security of the prison.”); Jesse Bogan, Illinois 
Inmate Says Rights Were Violated Over ‘Satanic Bible,’ ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, (Aug. 9, 2011), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/illinois/article_ 
d2bcf1f2-885b-5b26-8bab-4d75319e8314.html.  Also of note, the U.S. 
Department of Justice has issued an opinion in support of Virginia’s ban on 
The Satanic Bible in prisons. Letter of Finding from Michael Alton, Dir., Office 
for Civil Rights for the Dep’t of Justice, Office of Justice Programs to Harold 
Clarke, Dir., Va. Dep’t of Corr. (Aug. 12, 2013), https://ojp.gov/about/ocr/pdfs/V 
A-13-OCR-10.pdf. 
256.  Howard v. United States, 864 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Colo. 1994).  Only 
one other case appears to have been decided in favor of a Satanic inmate.  In 
2006, the Southern District of Illinois ruled that a state prison had not justified 
the confiscation of several books from an inmate, including The Satanic Bible 
and The Satanic Rituals, considering the inmate had possessed them for 
several months and they had previously been approved by the institutional 
publication committee.  Semla v. Snyder, No. 03-CV-00015-JPG, 2006 WL 
1465558, at *1 (S.D. Ill. May 24, 2006).  In a 2010 prison case, a magistrate 
judge for the District of Montana recommended that the parties submit further 
briefing on the question of whether a prison’s denial of an inmate’s request for 
a copy of The Satanic Bible was justified under the First Amendment and 
RLUIPA.  Indreland v. Yellowstone Cty. Bd. Of Commr’s, 693 F.Supp.2d 1230, 
1241-42 (D. Mont. 2010). No subsequent opinion of the court in this case is 
available. 
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month.257  For the time, he requested three hours in the 
morning.258  For the space, Howard requested a very small 
chamber (“even a broom closet will do”).259  For the implements, 
Howard asked for “candles, candle holders, incense, a gong, a 
black robe, a chalice, and a short wooden staff or other object 
suitable for pointing.”260 
In defense of his requests, Howard painted a significantly 
different picture of Satanism than Charles McCorkle had.  
According to Howard, his desired rituals, though avowedly 
Satanic, allowed him “to release his anger” and made him less 
violent.261  He also described his Satanic beliefs and practices, 
contrary to the claims of the prison, as being “non-violent in 
nature” and part of a “humanistic ethical system which would 
never allow for violence, rape, human sacrifice, animal sacrifice, 
[or] bloodletting.”262  Howard testified that Anton LaVey’s 
writing, including The Satanic Bible and The Satanic Rituals, 
was meant to be read symbolically, not literally.263 
Nevertheless, the prison denied Howard’s request to 
conduct his religious rituals.  According to the prison, allowing 
him or other Satanists to perform rituals “would pose a threat to 
the good order and security of the institution.”264  The warden 
testified that Howard’s various requested implements could 
cause a fire, mask smells, cause audible disruptions, obscure his 
identity, or be used as weapons.265  The warden also argued that 
allowing Howard to openly practice Satanism would be 
“inflammatory and . . . abhorrent to other inmates,” thus putting 
his safety at risk.266 
 
 
257.  Howard, 864 F. Supp. 1019, 1021–22 (D. Colo. 1994).  The rituals, 
according to Howard, were “a compassionate ritual, a destruction ritual, and a 
personal ritual.” 
258.  Id. at 1022. 
259.  Id. 
260.  Id.  Howard would not keep the implements after the conclusion of 
the rituals. 
261.  Id. 
262.  Id. 
263.  Howard, 864 F. Supp. at 1022. 
264.  Id. at 1021. 
265.  Id. at 1025. 
266.  Id. at 1025–26. 
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The District Court considered these arguments, and 
acknowledged that they were legitimate concerns.  However, the 
Court noted, “[t]he problem is that many of the other religious 
groups [in the prison] regularly use these very same—allegedly 
very dangerous—implements,” and “[n]o security problems have 
occurred.”267  As to Howard’s safety, the court brushed aside the 
warden’s worry. Howard testified that he was already open 
about his beliefs with other inmates, and, even though the court 
felt the safety argument had “a certain amount of intuitive 
appeal,” it was “not supported by one shred of evidence.”268 
Next, the Court considered the cases of McCorkle and Childs 
v. Duckworth, which both upheld prison restrictions on Satanic 
practices.269  Both cases were easily distinguishable on their 
facts, the Howard Court reasoned.  McCorckle especially was 
different, because the inmate’s professed Satanic beliefs in that 
case were violent and dangerous.270  Howard’s beliefs were 
peaceful and benign.271 
Ultimately, the Court granted Howard’s requested 
injunction, requiring the prison officials to stop denying his 
requests to practice his religious rituals.  It was clear to the 
Court that the prison’s concerns, while legitimate in theory, 
were unsupported by the evidence, and the prison officials had 
inappropriately “focused on the tenets of the religion itself . . . 
despite their professed concern for scarcity of resources and 
security.”272 
In this section we explored the negative impact Satanism 
has on its adherents inside prison walls.  With the exception of 
Robert Howard and maybe a few others, admitting to Satanic 
beliefs and seeking to exercise them freely can be quite a 
 
267.  Id. at 1025. 
268.  Id. at 1026. 
269.  Howard, 864 F. Supp. at 1026.  In Childs,705 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 
1983), the Seventh Circuit upheld the rejection of an Indiana inmate’s various 
requests for religious items such as a podium, candles and incense in his cell, 
a crystal ball, and the use of the interlibrary loan system for use of books for 
group study rather than individual use. 
270.  Howard, 864 F. Supp. at 1026. 
271.  Id. 
272.  Id. at 1029 (carefully noting that the ruling did “not require prison 
officials to accommodate every form of Satanism,” nor “require them to allow 
each inmate to become a religion unto himself”). 
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challenge for inmates in prison systems that consider it a 
security threat and a court system that defers to the judgment 
of the prisons. 
In the final section, Part V, we shift gears to our final, and 
somewhat lighter topic: what happens when the devil and his 
alleged minions themselves become parties to litigation. 
 
V.  The Litigious Devil 
 
But he turned, and said unto Peter, Get thee 
behind me, Satan: thou art an offense unto me: for 
thou savorest not the things that be of God, but 
those that be of men. – Matthew 16:23 
 
There is one more way the devil regularly appears in 
contemporary American law: as a party to the proceedings, not 
just as a nefarious defendant, but also sometimes also as a 
remedy-seeking petitioner.273 
As the “archvillain of world culture,” one might assume that 
Satan would be the target of more than a few lawsuits, even 
though, as the source of all evil in the world, he is probably 
uninsurable.  However, an inability to collect is not the only 
problem facing would-be plaintiffs seeking damages from the 
devil.  Other problems are procedural.274 
In 1971, Gerald Mayo sought leave from the Western 
District of Pennsylvania to file, in forma pauperis, a complaint 
against “Satan and his staff,” alleging that Satan had long 
harassed and troubled him and “placed deliberate obstacles in 
his path and caused [his] downfall.”275  These actions, Mayo 
argued, deprived him of his rights under the U.S. 
 
273.  Though this Section mostly features inmates challenging their 
incarceration, the nature of these particular claims does not fit under the same 
penological theme of Part IV, and thus a separate section felt appropriate.  
Also, as noted in the Introduction, outside the scope of this Article are 
copyright and other intellectual property claims by artists or organizations for 
whom Satan or other devilish imagery is the subject of their art. 
274.  For an entertaining guide to the nuts and bolts of suing Satan, see 
Charles Yablon, Suing the Devil: A Guide for Practitioners, 86 VA. L. REV. 103, 
103–15 (2000). 
275.  United States ex rel. Mayo v. Satan & Staff, 54 F.R.D. 282, 283 (W.D. 
Pa. 1971). 
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Constitution.276  Denying Mayo’s request to proceed in forma 
pauperis, the District Court questioned first the obvious 
inability of the Plaintiff to “obtain personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant in this judicial district.”277  The complaint, after all, 
included no allegation that Satan even lived in Pennsylvania.278  
Mayo also failed to include the required form of instructions for 
service of process to the U.S. Marshal.279  An unserved defendant 
is no defendant at all, and thus Mayo’s claim could go no further. 
Personal jurisdiction is not the only thing plaintiffs must 
establish in order to sue the dark lord, however.  They must also 
state a claim for which relief may be granted.280  The same goes 
if the defendants are merely Satan’s associates, rather than the 
devil himself.  This was the hurdle Tennessee inmate Alvin 
Kennedy faced when he tried to sue the Church of Satan in 
2008.281  This is what happened, according to the Court: 
 
On December 27, 2007, the plaintiff sent a 
letter to the Church of Satan in San Francisco, 
California requesting information about the 
church and Satanism. He also stated in the letter 
that he “was very serious about becoming a 
member of the Dark Side.” 
 
 
276.  Id. 
277.  Id. 
278.  Id.  Though, Pennsylvania does share a border with New Jersey, 
which is rumored to be home to its own particular form of devil.  See BRIAN 
REGAL & FRANK ESPOSITO, THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE JERSEY DEVIL: HOW 
QUAKERS, HUCKSTERS, AND BENJAMIN FRANKLIN CREATED A MONSTER (2018).  As 
an aside, the Court in Mayo also noted that no official court reports include 
any case where Satan has actually made an appearance in court, though “there 
is an unofficial account of a trial in New Hampshire where this defendant filed 
an action of mortgage foreclosure as plaintiff,” a winking nod to the plot of “The 
Devil and Daniel Webster,” the 1936 short story by Stephen Vincent Benet.  
Mayo, 54 F.R.D. at 283; see also STEPHEN VINCENT BENET, THE DEVIL AND 
DANIEL WEBSTER (Penguin Classics 1999) (1936). 
279.  Mayo, 54 F.R.D. at 283. 
280.  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).  For plaintiffs seeking 
to proceed in forma pauperis, like Mayo, federal law says courts “shall” dismiss 
their claims, sua sponte, for failing to state a viable cause of action.  See 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) (2018). 
281.  Kennedy v. Church of Satan, No. 3 08 0225, 2008 WL 594065, at *1 
(M.D. Tenn. Mar. 4, 2008). 
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Shortly thereafter, the Post Office returned 
the letter to the plaintiff with a note from “Mr. 
Satan” explaining that he was not approved to 
worship the Dark Side. The plaintiff believes that 
the defendant has violated his rights in some way 
by failing to provide him with the requested 
information and by not approving him for worship 
of the Dark Side.282 
 
Kennedy, proceeding pro se, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, 
alleging that the Church of Satan, acting under the color of state 
law, deprived him of his constitutional rights by rejecting his 
request for information and membership.283  The Court, finding 
no such action by the Church, summarily dismissed Kennedy’s 
suit for failing to state a viable claim.284 
Kennedy’s incarceration was incidental to his claim against 
the Church of Satan.  He did not sue the devil’s devotees for 
locking him up.  However, many other claims against the devil 
appear in petitions for writs of habeas corpus, where prisoners 
challenge the conditions of their detention.  In cases like those 
below, these litigious prisoners seek relief from far more sinister 
forces than their earthly wardens. 
In 2015, prison inmate Dommernick Brown filed a petition 
for writ of habeas corpus in the District of South Carolina.285  In 
habeas challenges, the proper respondent is the warden of the 
facility where the prisoner is being held,286 but Brown named a 
few other notable parties, including “The Super-Rich Illuminate 
(t-Worlders),” “The Anti-Christ (POPE Francis),” and “United 
Nations and Their So-Called New World Order of satan.”287  
 
282.  Id. at *1–2. 
283.  Id. at *2. 
284.  Id. 
285.  Brown v. Jett, No. 4:15-cv-01983-TLW, 2015 WL 11142468, at *1 (D. 
S.C. June 17, 2015), vacated,  621 F. App’x 260 (4th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).  
The full caption of the case lists Brown as “Dommernick Brown #11049-171, 
United States of America, Suis Juris-Pro Se and Pro Se Coach-In Forma 
Pauperis and Supporter of The-Second Coming of Jesus Christ Super-Star The 
Messiah and Super-Star-and The Version of The New World Order #777 
ALMIGHTY-GODs New World Order 777, Petitioner.” 
286.  Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004). 
287.  Brown v. Jett, No. 4:15-1983-TLW-TER, 2015 WL 11120723, at *1 
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Noting the warden rule, the Court dismissed the petition as to 
all other respondents.288 
Meanwhile, a civilly committed Minnesota man named Paul 
Payen also filed a habeas petition in 2015, challenging his 
ongoing involuntary hospitalization for mental illness.289  
Payen’s petition was similar to Brown’s in that he listed, along 
with the warden of the hospital, several curiously-named 
respondents, including “Aliens, (Demons and Devils and 
U.F.O.’s) (Some Good and Some Evil),” “Prophet Ezekiel’s 
Wheel,” “Reptoids and Reptillians of the Lower Fourth 
Dimension,” and, more relevantly, the “New World Order of 
Satan–# 666” and “Fall of Satanic–Same Sex Marriages.”290  The 
District Court originally dismissed Payen’s entire petition for 
want of a proper respondent, but on appeal the Eighth Circuit 
reversed, finding that Payen had at least correctly named the 
warden of his facility and had alleged facts sufficient for the 
Court’s consideration, even though his petition was otherwise 
“largely incoherent.”291  Unfortunately for Payen, remand 
provided no relief, because his petition, still incoherent, was 
ultimately dismissed on the merits as well.292 
A third example of this genre is a habeas petition filed in 
2016 by another South Carolina prison inmate, Julian 
Rochester.  Unlike Dommernick Brown and Paul Payen before 
him, Mr. Rochester kept it simple.  He named just one 
respondent to his petition, “Head Warden B. McKie, Satan.”293  
However, the devil would once again escape accountability for 
his infernal injustices.  Over Rochester’s objections, the District 
Court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation for 
dismissal, the objections being no more than “rambling 
nonsensical statements, various case citations, profanity, and 
 
(D. S.C. May 29, 2015). 
288.  Id. 
289.  Payen v. Jett, 610 F. App’x. 594 (8th Cir. 2015). 
290.  Id. 
291.  Id. at 595. 
292.  Payen v. Jett, No. 15–122 (JRT/HB), 2016 WL 3149665, at *1 (D. 
Minn. June 3, 2016). 
293.  Rochester v. McKie, No.: 6:15-cv-03258-RBH, 2016 WL 2756432, at 
*1 (D. S.C. May 12, 2016).  
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cartoon illustrations.”294 
Our discussion of the litigious devil concludes with one very 
unique petitioner, a man who may or may not actually be the 
devil himself. 
In 2012, a California state prison inmate filed a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus in the Central District of California.295  The 
Petitioner was convicted in 2008 on misdemeanor and felony 
charges of criminal threat, cultivating marijuana, and 
“electronically contacting someone with the intent to annoy, 
using profane language and threats to inflict injury on the other 
person and his family.”296  Despite reversal of the latter 
conviction and his incarceration having ended two years prior, 
the Petitioner nevertheless challenged his incarceration on the 
bases of ineffective assistance of counsel and involuntary guilty 
plea.297 
So who was this petitioner?  His birth name was Edmond 
Frank MacGillivray, Jr., but he legally changed it in 1988 to “I 
am the Beast Six six six of the Lord of Hosts in Edmond Frank 
MacGillivray, Jr. now” or “I am the Beast Sssotlohiefmjn” for 
short.298 
Mr. Sssotlohiefmjn first came under the scrutiny of law 
enforcement in 2007 for sending a series of strange and 
threatening messages, including an online comment to a news 
article (signed “666BEAST666”) in which he claimed to be 
“considering a killing spree” on the campus of Mt. San Jacinto 
College where he would “off a bunch of preschoolers” at the 
school’s daycare facility.299  The college went on lockdown, but 
Sssotlohiefmjn never attempted any violent action.  




294.  Id. 
295.  Sssotlohiefmjn v. Riverside Cty. Superior Court, No. EDCV 10–925–
GHK (AGR), 2012 WL 4791932, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2012). 
296. Id.  For the state Appellate Court ruling, see People v. 
Sssotlohiefmjn, No. E047144, 2010 WL 219336, at *1 (Cal. App. Jan. 22, 2010). 
297.  Sssotlohiefmjn, 2012 WL 4791932, at *5. 
298.  I Am The Beast etc. v. Michigan State Police, No. 5:89:92, 1990 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS, at *1 (W.D. Mich. July 12, 1990).  His previous name was Edmond 
Frank MacGillivray, Jr.  Sssotlohiefmjn, 2012 WL 4791932, at *1 n.1. 
299.  Sssotlohiefmjn, 2012 WL 4791932, at *2. 
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subsequent search of his residence produced five marijuana 
plants.300 
His petition proved to be a rare win for the devil in the 
federal courts.  A federal magistrate judge recommended that 
Mr. Sssotlohiefmjn’s petition for relief be granted on the first 
ground (ineffective assistance of counsel), but not on the second 
ground (involuntary guilty plea).  The magistrate also 
recommended that his marijuana conviction be vacated, leaving 
the misdemeanor criminal threat as the only conviction on his 
record.301  The District Court agreed, and the Beast was no 




This Article surveyed five key legal contexts in which the 
devil appears.  Accusations of Satanism have long been a source 
of civil liability in defamation claims.  Courts sometimes allow 
prosecutors to admit evidence of devil worship to convict and 
sentence criminal defendants.  Too-sincere beliefs in Lucifer can 
support insanity defenses at trial or be grounds for invalidating 
a will.  Courts often affirm restrictions on the practice of 
Satanism within prisons, and litigants sometimes list the dark 
lord (or some other variant of his name) as a party to their 
lawsuits. 
Again, this Article offers no theory or prescription as to how 
courts should handle Satanism in any of the above contexts, but 
it does raise several important questions for future research and 
argument.  As just a few examples: are American courts 
adhering to the Supreme Court’s ban on religious tests when 
they assess evidence of Satanic belief?  Do negative cultural 
stereotypes about devil worship create bias in the courtroom?  
And, are Satanists being left out of the recent legal and political 
push for increased religious freedom? 
These questions and others deserve serious consideration.  
No matter how despised the devil may be in the Christian 
 
300.  Id. at *7. 
301.  Sssotlohiefmjn, 2012 WL 4791618, at *1.  California does not appear 
to have appealed this ruling or moved to retry Mr. Sssotlohiefmjn on the 
marijuana charge. 
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cultural tradition of the United States, the Constitution—and 
long-standing Supreme Court doctrine—requires free exercise 
for all and equal treatment under the law.  Our courts and our 
legal system should adhere to those principles even when 
confronted with religious beliefs most people may still find 
nefarious. 
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